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ARTICLE
Predictably Incoherent Judgments
Cass R. Sunstein,* Daniel Kahneman,**
David Schkade*** & Ilana Ritov****
When people make moral or legal judgments in isolation, they produce a
pattern of outcomes that they would themselves reject, if only they could see that
pattern as a whole. A major reason is that human thinking is category-bound.
When people see a case in isolation, they spontaneously compare it to other cases
that are mainly drawn from the same category of harms. When people are
required to compare cases that involve different kinds of harms, judgments that
appear sensible when the problems are considered separately often appear
incoherent and arbitrary in the broader context. Another major source of
incoherence is what we call the translation problem: The translation of moral
judgments into the relevant metrics of dollars and years is not grounded in either
principle or intuition, and produces large differences among people. The
incoherence produced by category-bound thinking is illustrated by an
experimental study of punitive damages and contingent valuation. We also show
how category-bound thinking and the translation problem combine to produce
anomalies in administrative penalties. The underlying phenomena have large
implications for many topics in law, including jury behavior, the valuation of
public goods, punitive damages, criminal sentencing, and civil fines. We
consider institutional reforms that might overcome the problem of predictably
incoherent judgments. Connections are also drawn to several issues in legal
theory, including valuation of life, incommensurability, and the aspiration to
global coherence in adjudication.
" Karl N. Llewellyn Distinguished Service Professor, University of Chicago.
Eugene Higgins Professor of Psychology and Professor of Public Affairs, Princeton
University.
"" Herbert D. Kelleher Professor of Business, University of Texas, Austin.
.... Associate Professor, Hebrew University of Jerusalem. For helpful comments, we
are grateful to Eric Posner, Richard Posner, and participants in workshops at the John F.
Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, the University of Chicago Law
School, and Yale Law School.
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Why didn't the Commission sit down and really go and rationalize this
thing... ? The short answer to that is: We couldn't .... Try listing all the
crimes that there are in rank order of punishable merit .... Then collect results
from your friends and see if they all match. I will tell you they won't.
Justice Stephen Breyer'
I. INTRODUCTION: COHERENCE AND INCOHERENCE
A. Basic Claims
Coherence in law is a widely shared ideal. Almost everyone hopes for a
legal system in which the similarly situated are treated similarly. But there are
many obstacles to the achievement of coherence in the law. This article is
concerned with one particular test of incoherence, and with two cognitive
limitations that help cause many failures of that test in actual legal systems.
We believe that these failures are also failures of justice, and that they suggest
a pervasive problem in existing legal systems.
Coherence can be understood and incoherence can be tested in many
different ways. In this article, our test of incoherence is simple and
straightforward. We ask: When two or more judgments have been made
separately, and each seems to make sense on its own, do they still make sense
when considered together?2 When this test of incoherence is satisfied, and a
need is felt to adjust or reverse the judgments that were made separately, we
will speak of judgment reversals. The test of incoherence can be readily
applied to decisions by juries and by judges.' With suitable modifications, it
can also be applied to acts of legislators and regulators. More generally, we
ask whether judgments made in isolation fit together in an orderly way when
considered as part of the larger whole.
Our emphasis will be on many categories of harms with which the law is
concerned, such as physical injury, commercial fraud, and ecological damage.
Our first psychological observation is that in law, as in ordinary life, people's
thinking is category-bound. People do not easily cross the boundaries of
1. Justice Stephen Breyer, quoted in Jeffrey Rosen, Even Stephen, NEW REPUBLIC,
June 6, 1994, at 12.
2. We emphasize that this is a test of incoherence, and that if incoherence in this sense
is not shown, there might still be incoherence in some other sense. Of course, it is possible
to criticize people's judgments on grounds independent of coherence; we address this point
at several places below.
3. Note that this is a test of incoherence, not of social consensus, which was explored
in Cass R. Sunstein, Daniel Kahneman & David Schkade, Assessing Punitive Damages, 107
YALE L.J. 2071 (1998). But the absence of consensus on dollar amounts, discussed below,
does bear on the possibility of achieving coherence.
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categories4 of harms in their thinking. When they consider an individual case
of physical injury, or commercial fraud, the frame of reference for evaluation is
usually a set of instances of the same kind of harm.5 When setting penalties for
a category of cases, such as violations of regulations for occupational safety,
regulators will naturally focus on instances that belong to that category. They
are much less likely to concern themselves with the consistency of their
determinations with punishments for other categories of harmful conduct, such
as damage to endangered species. Yet, as we will show, simultaneous
consideration of penalties for different kinds of infractions will often reveal
that the more severe punishment was assigned to the misconduct which, in
context, appears to be the less serious.
A second significant source of incoherence is what we shall call the
translation problem. By this term, we refer to the distinctive problem involved
in translating a moral judgment of some kind6 into the terms made relevant by
the legal system, such as monetary penalties, civil fines, or criminal
punishment. 7 We argue that the act of translation causes serious problems,
because it is grounded neither in agreed-upon principle nor in widely shared
intuitions. Even when people show coherent and consistent moral intuitions,
they may show little consistency and coherence in translating those intuitions
into numbers, such as dollars of fines or years in jail. Because of the
translation problem, coherence fails: There is no guarantee that the relative
severity of punishments administered by the system will still appear sensible,
just, or fair when several punishments are considered together. The translation
problem helps identify the cognitive foundations of current controversies over
criminal sentencing, punitive damages, and contingent valuation. It affects the
work not only of juries, but also of legislative and regulatory bodies that
determine punishments for different kinds of misconduct within a particular
category. The result, we will argue, is that the overall level of penalties set by
different regulatory agencies may appear sensible when each set of regulations
is considered on its own, but meets our test of incoherence when several sets
are considered at once.
4. We say a few words below on the nature of categories.
5. Daniel Kahneman & Dale Miller, Norm Theory: Comparing Reality to its
Alternatives, 93 PSYCHOL. REv. 136 (1986).
6. We use this term because as a matter of fact, moral judgments appear to be the
foundation of punishments. On the economic theory of punishment, optimal deterrence is
the goal, and optimal deterrence is in conflict with ordinary intuitions, as we discuss in detail
below. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis,
111 HARv. L. REv. 869, 870-76 (1998). For interesting reasons, the translation problem is
not a serious one from the standpoint of economic analysis of law. We will explain this
point below.
7. We initially discussed the translation problem, under the technical term "scaling
without a modulus," in the particular context of punitive damage awards in Sunstein et al.,
supra note 3. We generalize the problem here.
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We consider it self-evident that if it exists, incoherence in punishments is a
form of injustice. We shall also assume that when the public would not believe
that outcomes fit sensibly together, this is a problem that calls for social
response.8 Indeed, how could one support a system that generates outcomes
that do not make sense when taken together? We will assume that the points in
this paragraph are correct, without defending them in any detail.
The coherence and incoherence of punishments, both civil and criminal,
will be the focus of our analysis, and in this domain we will attempt to show
considerable reason for concern. Juries typically assess cases in isolation; in
fact lawyers are actually barred from referring to awards in other cases.
Administrators, and congressional committees setting up penalties for
regulatory misconduct, typically deal with one category of misconduct, and do
not attend to problems of other types.9 Criminal sentences are established over
time by different legislatures and legislative committees, with little effort to
ensure a good fit of penalties to crimes across a broad frame of reference.10
Because people are not inclined to consider the overall pattern-either because
it is too difficult to do so or because it does not occur to them to try-the
problem of incoherence does not naturally receive attention." As things now
stand, the structure of those institutions charged with making regulatory and
legislative decisions reinforces the effects of category-bound thinking.
Scandalously large inconsistencies can therefore persist indefinitely, in the
absence of a special effort to impose coherence.
The fact that coherence cannot be taken for granted has significant
implications for institutional design. It suggests, in some domains, a possible
reason to favor judicial decisions over jury decisions, because judges are more
8. We are taking the public's beliefs as given here, and establishing only that
identifiable cognitive mechanisms make it difficult for the legal system to reduce or
eliminate incoherence in the sense that we describe. If the public's beliefs are wrong, and if
there is reason, in principle, to produce a system of punishments that people would consider
incoherent, the normative analysis is of course more complicated. We believe that in some
cases, the public's beliefs are indeed likely to be objectionable; but we do not believe that
the forms of incoherence that we uncover here are usually based on a principled rejection of
the public's beliefs. Of course a legal system that rejects the beliefs of the public may run
into its own problems, even if there is a principled basis for rejecting those beliefs.
9. Indeed, an administrator or regulator who shows explicit concern with problems that
lie outside his or her jurisdiction risks being criticized as improperly "poaching" on someone
else's turf, or even having his decision held unlawful. See Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp.
v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633 (1990) (allowing agency entrusted with pension guarantees not
to consider other, relevant areas of law, and suggesting that any such consideration could
violate the underlying statute).
10. As shown below, the goals of the United States Sentencing Commission are, on
this dimension, quite unambitious. In fact a version of the translation problem appears in the
international domain, where criminal sentencing also shows a degree of incoherence. See
Allison Marston Danner, Constructing a Hierarchy of Crimes in International Criminal
Sentencing, 87 VA. L. REv. 415 (2001).
11. Indeed we believe that this article is the first to venture even a tentative assessment
of the pattern of administrative penalties, at least within the legal structure.
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likely to have a menu of cases before them. Because judges are human, 2 they
too are susceptible to producing incoherent patterns; 3 but especially if the risk
of incoherence is brought to judicial attention, they might well be likely to do
better, on this count, than juries. Our claims also suggest the potential value of
"coherence commissions," assigned the explicit mission to ensure that
decisions fit together as an orderly whole, or at least to correct the most serious
anomalies. We bring the idea of "coherence commissions" in contact with
many areas of the law, including civil and criminal penalties, punitive damages,
and valuation of statistical lives. We will also attempt to cast new light on
some large topics in legal theory, including the aspiration to similar treatment
of the similarly situated, the twentieth-century movement toward
bureaucracy, 4 and the general problem of "incommensurability." Discussing
several different kinds of incoherence, we identify some of the cognitive limits
of the aspiration to global coherence in law,'5 while also pointing the way
toward institutional reforms that could overcome those limits. We urge that
"coherence commissions" could do a great deal to reduce existing injustice, in
a way that would provide a twenty-first century analogue to important, but less
ambitious, institutional developments in the twentieth century.
B. Specific Points
In this article, we will be covering many topics, some of them in
considerable detail. For purposes of exposition, it will be useful to give an
overview of the specific claims that undergird our general arguments about
incoherence:
" The moral intuitions of the public are firmly retributive in
character. 6  The intensity of what we shall call "punitive
intention"--the desire to punish wrongdoing-is influenced both
by the outrageousness of an action and by the severity of the harm
that the action caused.
* It is extremely difficult for people to translate punitive intentions
into the terms made relevant by the legal system, such as fines or
prison terms. That task is not rooted in shared intuitions, moral or
otherwise, and outcomes can be largely arbitrary and
12. Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey Rachlinsk & Andrew Wistrich, Inside the Judicial Mind, 86
CORNELL L. REV. 778 (2001).
13. This was an explicit rationale for the formulation of the Sentencing Guidelines.
14. A helpful overview is PRICE FISHBACK & SHAWN KANTOR, A PRELUDE TO THE
WELFARE STATE: THE ORIGINS OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION (1999); also see JERRY
MASHAW, DUE PROCESS IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE (1983) for a valuable discussion in
the context of social security disability determinations.
15. See RONALD DwORKN, LAW'S EMPIRE (1985).
16. As recognized by the Supreme Court in Cooper Indus., Inc., v. Leatherman Tool
Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424,432 n.5, 437 n.11 (2001).
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unpredictable. Different juries may express the same punitive
intention, but come up with quite different dollar awards. The
bodies that set administrative punishments for particular categories
of misconduct may differ widely in the general range of
punishments that they choose, for no principled reason. State
legislatures may produce widely varying punishments for the same
crime, not because of different moral judgments, but simply
because of the translation problem.
" If people are asked to assess cases that fall within a particular
category of actions and harms, but are not asked to translate their
punitive intentions into dollars or years, people's judgments tend
to be both shared and coherent.' 7  It follows that if they are
evaluating cases within each category, diverse people are likely to
agree on how to rank a set of personal injury cases, business fraud
cases, sexual harassment cases, or libel cases by their "punishable
merit" (Justice Breyer's term).
* When asked to evaluate a case separately and hence in isolation,
people spontaneously proceed by comparing it against others
falling within the same category. 8 Thus, for example, people's
responses to a case of business fraud will be generated largely by
comparing that case to other cases of business fraud. If the case of
business fraud involves extremely egregious misconduct that
caused very severe harm in this frame of reference, people will be
extremely outraged. The fact that there are other categories of
cases, involving actions that people view as more evil and harms
that they think more serious, will be effectively neglected. We
call this effect "normalization."
" The requirement directly to compare cases drawn from different
categories of harmful actions can cause large shifts in moral
evaluations, punitive intentions, and actual punishments, relative
to the judgments of the same cases in isolation. Such shifts, which
we generically label judgment reversals, provide a diagnostic
indication of a breakdown of coherence.
* There is less consensus on the ranking of cases in the hierarchy of
"punishable merit" when the cases involve different kinds of
harms (e.g., personal injury vs. environmental damage) than when
they belong to the same category. Harms from different categories
17. The claim is based on results reported by Daniel Kahneman, David Schkade &
Cass R. Sunstein, Shared Outrage and Unpredictable Awards, 16 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY
49 (1998) and Sunstein et al., supra note 3.
18. See Kahneman & Miller, supra note 5; see also Daniel Kahneman, Ilana Ritov &
David Schkade, Economic Preferences or Attitude Expressions? An Analysis of Dollar
Responses to Public Issues, 19 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 220 (1999).
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may seem "incommensurable," because they cannot easily be
described in terms of the same dimensions: The question of how
many animals died, for example, is relevant in one of these
situations but not in the other. The difficulty of comparisons
across categories of harms is one of the cognitive sources of the
difficulty described by Justice Breyer.
* There is substantial consensus on the ranking of categories,
including those created or used by the law. People agree, for
example, that murder is worse than rape, that rape is worse than
assault, and that assault is worse than libel. We suspect, however,
that there is less social agreement on the ranking of categories than
on the ranking of cases within categories.
* In spite of the difficulties of comparing categories of cases and
cases across categories, there is in many cases sufficient consensus
to permit a test of incoherence, which examines whether
judgments made in isolation are still retained when explicitly
compared.
We illustrate these claims by investigating judgments in several kinds of
domains-some of them experimental, some involving actual government
practice. The first involves punitive damages awards. Here we show that
people rank cases within a given category of harms in a consistent and coherent
fashion, that their judgments about isolated cases are "normalized" according
to the category in which they fall-but that these narrowly-based and easily-
made judgments shift when people are compelled to consider the case in a
broader context, by forcing a comparison to a case that involves harm of a
different kind. The second kind of problem involves contingent valuation-an
influential method of valuation by which people assign dollar values to goods
that are not ordinarily traded on markets. 9 We observe a similar pattern here.
The amount that the public will be willing to pay to prevent or correct some
harm to a public good will be very different depending on whether the goods
and the harms are viewed in isolation or in explicit comparison with harms to
goods and harms from another category.20 This point fortifies existing doubts
about the rationality and reliability of the contingent valuation method.21
19. See, e.g., VALUING ENVIRONMENTAL PREFERENCES (Ian Bateman & K. G. Willis
eds., 1999); GEORGE TOLLEY, DONALD KENKEL & ROBERT FABIAN, VALUING HEALTH FOR
POLICY (1995).
20. See Julie Irwin, Paul Slovic, Sarah Lichtenstein & Gary H. McClelland, Preference
Reversals and the Measurement of Environmental Values, 6 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 5
(1993) (discussing effects of comparisons between improvements in air quality and
consumer commodities on relative preference).
21. See Peter A. Diamond & Jerry A. Hausman, Contingent Valuation: Is Some
Number Better Than No Number?, 8 J. ECON. PERSP. 45, 49-52 (1994) (questioning
reliability of willingness-to-pay as a measurement of true valuation); Note, "Ask a Silly
Question... ": Contingent Valuation of Natural Resource Damages, 105 HARV. L. REv.
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A third kind of problem involves administrative penalties. Investigating
actual statutory practice, we find that such penalties tend to make a great deal
of sense within categories, because, for example, the more serious occupational
safety and health violations are penalized more severely than the less serious
ones. At the same time, administrative practice seems to make little sense as a
whole: Once the practices of diverse agencies are put together, the area appears
pervaded by cross-category anomalies. What requires explanation here is both
how such anomalies arise and why they persist. We argue that the anomalies
arise from the combined effects of category-bound thinking and the arbitrary
nature of the translation of moral judgments into punishments. The anomalies
persist because of the absence of a strong perceived need, at the individual and
social levels, to ensure coherence. Apparently no constituency is seeking to
ensure that the individual penalties fit together as a whole. In fact we believe
that ours is the first effort, within the legal culture, even to explore the question
of coherence in civil penalties-a point that attests to the fact that people can
live (perhaps in ignorant bliss) with patterns that make little general sense.
Here as well, underlying sources of the difficulty are category-bound
judgments and the translation problem. The result is injustice and arbitrariness.
While emphasizing the problem of incoherence, we do not suggest that
coherence is sufficient to produce good outcomes. Systems that are internally
coherent can and should be criticized on independent grounds.22 It is also
possible to insist that in some domains, the price of coherence is too steep,
perhaps because of the administrative costs of achieving it, or perhaps because
coherence can be achieved only by altering some institutions, outcomes, and
judgments that, on independent normative grounds, turn out to be good. But
incoherence of the sort documented here is at the very least a serious problem,
because it ensures a set of results that would widely be seen as indefensible and
arbitrary. One of our largest goals is to uncover the mechanisms that help to
produce this state of affairs, and to see what might be done about it.
C. Plans
This article is organized as follows. Part II provides some general
background on the concept of coherence. Part III explores the psychology
underlying the forms of incoherence that are our focus here. Part IV turns to
the basic cases of punitive damages and contingent valuation, offering
experimental evidence of judgment reversals. In order to provide a focus for
1981 (1992) (discussing speculative nature of contingent valuation measurements in the
context of natural resources).
22. See Joseph Raz, The Relevance of Coherence, in ETHics IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN
261 (1994). Raz emphasizes that "[c]oherence conveys a specific good, the value of which
is undeniable. What is incoherent is unintelligible, because it is self-contradictory,
fragmented, disjointed." Id. at 264. However, Raz goes on to raise serious doubts about
coherence theories. Id. at 265-70. We do not investigate the resulting complexities here.
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normative work on incoherence in law, Part V discusses the implications of our
findings for punitive damages awards. Part VI explores more general
implications by showing patterns of administrative penalties that most
reasonable people would reject as incoherent, and that nevertheless persist
indefinitely, reflecting the pervasive indifference to issues of global coherence
that we have attributed to human cognition.
Our basic purpose is descriptive, but we also contend that, at a minimum,
we have uncovered a serious problem, one that infects judgments and penalties
in many areas of the law. While emphasizing the difficulty of achieving
agreement on the requirements of full coherence, we suggest that many steps
can be taken to correct the worst anomalies. In Part VII, we urge that as an
ideal, the legal system should attempt to create institutions that would create
more in the way of systemic rationality, and that where results do not fit, there
is likely to be a problem of injustice. With respect to the federal budget, the
Office of Management and Budget was originally created on just this ground,
and the Sentencing Guidelines had similar aspirations (as yet unrealized, partly
because of the absence of explicit cross-category comparisons). With respect
to regulation, there are some related problems: The existence of large and
apparently inexplicable disparities in expenditures per life saved is, in part,
testimony to the absence of sustained cross-category comparisons. Of course
the jury system raises special problems and concerns, and there are large
questions about the extent to which reforms, even dramatic ones, might
overcome the problems stressed here.
In Part VIII, we show that our analysis bears on some larger issues in legal
theory, including the debate over the value and possibility of coherence in law
and the nature and existence of "incommensurability." A main theme is that
any effort to proceed "one case at a time" will produce serious problems,
because of identifiable features of human cognition. We also attempt to show
the cognitive basis for the experience of incommensurability. Our closing plea
is for institutional changes designed to overcome the problems we identify,
replacing predictably incoherent judgments with reforms whose goal is to
reduce the worst anomalies and perhaps to do much more in the process.
I. COHERENCE IN GENERAL
Our emphasis here will be on the particular types of incoherence that stem
from the human tendency to make category-bound judgments, and from the
arbitrariness of the translation of punitive intent into actual punishments. But
this type of incoherence should be understood against a more general
background, formed by the broader interest in coherence as a goal and by a
continuing debate within economics and other social sciences.
HeinOnline  -- 54 Stan. L. Rev. 1161 2001-2002
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Ethical and political philosophers have often viewed inconsistencies with
concern,2 treating them as local warps in a web of beliefs that must be repaired
by adequate reflection, in which specific beliefs are brought in line with each
other and with broader principles.24 The search for "reflective equilibrium" is
designed to ensure that one's beliefs, at multiple levels of abstraction, fit
together as a sensible whole.2s There is a similar aspiration to coherence within
law,26 though a decentralized system with numerous judges may well have
special difficulty in achieving that goal.27 Our central findings here will show
some new difficulties with efforts to achieve anything corresponding to
reflective equilibrium within the legal system, or even in moral judgments.
"Rational agent" theories in social sciences, and much important theorizing
in the domain of law, rest on the assumption that human agents are endowed
with coherent systems of beliefs and preferences, and define coherence as the
principal criterion of rationality.2 s An influential definition of rationality
avoids any normative evaluation of the specific contents of beliefs and choices,
and refers neither to the truth of beliefs nor to the consequences of choices.29
Only internal consistency matters. 0 In modem economic thinking, and in the
economic analysis of law in particular, coherence is considered a touchstone of
rationality.3 The preferences of the idealized rational agent provide a coherent
ordering of possible states of affairs, and the beliefs of that agent permit an
23. See id. at 261-78.
24. See GILBERT HARMAN, CHANGE IN VIEW (1986) (exploring reasoned changes in
view and the processes by which rational actors incorporate new beliefs into their belief
systems); DAVID 0. BRINK, MORAL REALISM AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF ETHICS 130-33
(1989) (describing a coherence theory in ethics, in which moral actors strive to resolve
conflicts between beliefs until they "achieve maximum coherence among all [their]
beliefs"); Germain Grisez, Joseph Boyle & John Finnis, Practical Principles, Moral Truth,
and Ultimate Ends, 32 Am. J. JuRis. 231, 107-08, 137-38 (1987) (discussing consistency or
"harmony" between one's beliefs, judgments, choices, and actions as a moral good).
25. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 19-22, 46-51 (1971) (discussing
"reflective equilibrium").
26. See DWORKIN, supra note 15.
27. See CASS R. SUNSTEN, LEGAL REASONING AND POLITICAL CONFLICT 50-52 (1996)
(discussing the challenges to coherence in law posed by multiple actors, disagreements over
first principles, and other constraints on judicial decisionmaking).
28. For overviews of rational choice theory, see GARY S. BECKER, ACCOUNTING FOR
TASTES (1996); RATIONAL CHOICE (Jon Elster ed., 1986); RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF LAw ch.1 (5th ed. 1998).
29. See JOHN VON NEUMANN & OSKAR MORGENSTERN, THEORY OF GAMES AND
ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR 8-9, 42-43 (2d ed. 1947) (defining rationality to involve utility
maximization by individual actors, without reference to the normative desirability of the
preferences or ends sought).
30. For an outline and critique of this approach, see Amartya Sen, Internal Consistency
of Choice, 61 ECONOMETRICA 495 (1993).
31. See id.
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ordering of events by their probabilities. 2 Furthermore, the dispositions to
form new beliefs in the light of evidence, or to make choices when new options
are offered, are also assumed to belong to the same coherent structure.
33
Doubts about the possibility of achieving coherence lie at the core of a
continuing debate about the "rationality" of human agents, involving
economists, decision theorists, and psychologists, as well as philosophers and
academic lawyers.34 It is now well-known that people are not in fact perfectly
rational. 35 They are better described, in Herbert Simon's phrase, as boundedly
rational.36 Bounded rationality has both cognitive and motivational aspects.
37
Because of the limitations in their ability to process information, boundedly
rational agents are not able to maintain a system of beliefs, preferences, and
dispositions that is both comprehensive and internally coherent. At best, such
agents are locally coherent-achieving consistency over small regions of the
space of possible events and outcomes, but not between more remote regions.
Boundedly rational agents are also cognitive misers-they economize on
difficult thinking and are not inclined to search for inconsistencies among their
ideas, or even to acknowledge inconsistencies, unless they are pressured to do
so. In particular, we -will develop the claim that people effortlessly achieve
local coherence in their rankings of actions and outcomes, but show limited
ability and little interest in global coherence. As a result, global incoherence
can persist for long periods.
As a practical matter, complete consistency of beliefs and preferences is an
unattainable ideal for any individual, and probably for any legal system.
Failures of consistency are inevitable, but some are easier to avoid than others.
People are normally successful at avoiding immediate inconsistencies between
statements they make in the same setting, but it is much harder to prevent
remote inconsistencies between a judgment one makes now and judgments
32. See BECKER, supra note 28, ch.1 (1999) (considering the effect of experience and
social factors on preference formation by rational agents); LEONARD J. SAVAGE, THE
FOUNDATIONS OF STATISTICS (1954) (setting out a personalistic theory of probability that
assumes individuals act rationally to assign probabilities to different events or to the truth of
particular propositions).
33. See SAVAGE, supra note 32.
34. For multi-disciplinary approaches to this question, see, e.g., THE RATIONAL
FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC BEHAVIOUR (Kenneth J. Arrow, Enrico Colombatto, Mark
Perlman & Christian Schmidt eds., 1996); GERD GIGERENZER, PETER M. TODD & THE ABC
RESEARCH GROUP, SIMPLE HEURISTICS THAT MAKE US SMART (1999); CHOICES, VALUES,
AND FRAMES (Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky eds., 2000).
35. For an overview of fundamental ways in which human behavior departs from strict
economic rationality, see Christine Jolls, Cass R Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral
Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L REV. 1471, 1476-80 (1998).
36. See Herbert A. Simon, Rationality and Administrative Decision Making, in
MODELS OF MAN 196, 196-200 (1957); see generally Herbert A. Simon, A Behavioral Model
of Rational Choice, 69 Q. J. ECON. 99 (1955) (setting out an account of rationality based on
the psychological limitations of human actors).
37. For an overview, see JON ELSTER, SOUR GRAPES (1983).
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made, or accepted, in the past. It is harder still to prevent situations in which a
judgment that one makes now is inconsistent with a judgment that one would
make if one were asked a different question (or the same question in different
words). People who are unable to ensure that their current judgments are
consistent with other judgments they accept, or with judgments they would
make or would have made under different circumstances, inevitably produce a
pattern of outcomes that they would themselves consider incoherent and
indefensible. We will see this problem in many legal and policy domains.
III. CAUSES OF INCOHERENCE
In this section we review in some detail the psychological underpinnings of
the analysis to be presented in this article. Much of our treatment here is an
effort both to extend and to generalize our earlier empirical research on
punitive damages3s and on contingent valuation,39 and more generally to build
on previous theoretical and empirical analyses, not yet applied to law and
policy, of intuitive judgment,40 attitudes and emotions, 41 and spontaneous
categorization. 42 We also offer two empirical results that we report for the first
time here. The first is an experiment that demonstrates category-bound
incoherence in judgments of punitive damages and in contingent valuation.
The second is an examination of category-bound incoherence in administrative
penalties. In this section, we explore the psychological mechanisms in some
depth.
Our previous studies indicated that the dollar numbers produced by jurors
in civil cases involving punitive awards, and by respondents in contingent
valuation surveys, can be interpreted as expressions of the intensity of a
positive or negative attitude-an emotional evaluation of a defendant, or of a
public issue.43 Specifically, we have argued that punitive damages are an
38. See Daniel Kahneman & Ilana Ritov, Determinants of Stated Willingness to Pay
for Public Goods: A Study in the Headline Method, 9 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 5, 30 (1994);
Kahneman et al., supra note 18; Kahmeman et al., supra note 17; David Schkade, Cass R.
Sunstein & Daniel Kahneman, Deliberating About Dollars: The Severity Shift, 100 COLUM.
L. REV. 1139 (2000); Sunstein et al., supra note 3; Cass R. Sunstein, David Schkade &
Daniel Kahneman, Do People Want Optimal Deterrence?, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 237 (2000).
39. See Kahneman & Ritov, supra note 38.
40. See Daniel Kahneman & Shane Frederick, Representativeness Revisited: Attribute
Substitution in Intuitive Judgment, in HEuiusTIcs OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT: ExTENSIONS AND
APPLICATIONS (Thomas Gilovich, Dale Griffin & Daniel Kahneman, eds., forthcoming
2002).
41. See Kahmeman & Frederick, supra note 40; Kalmeman et al., supra note 18; Paul
Slovic et al., The Affect Heuristic, in HEURISTICS OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT, supra note 40.
42. See Kahneman & Miller, supra note 5.
43. We intend to take no stand on the relationship between emotion and cognition. See
JON ELSTER, ALCHEMIES OF THE MIND (1999); MARTHA NUSSBAUM, UPHEAVALS OF
THOUGHT (2001).
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expression of indignation or outrage on a scale of dollars, and we identified the
problem of translating outrage onto that unfamiliar scale as a critical cause of
unpredictability in punitive awards. We extend this conception of punishment
here, by adding that (i) reprehensible actions are naturally categorized, and (ii)
outrage and its manifestations-including punitive damages-involve a
process that situates any particular case in relation to its category. We will
show that this manifestation of category-bound thinking yields systematic
incoherence in punitive intentions and in punitive awards.
We also extend the same analysis of punishment to a task that at first
glance seems to involve little emotion: the setting of penalties by legislative or
administrative bodies. The leap is not as radical as it may appear at first. We
argue that members of a society are in wide agreement on the categorization of
reprehensible actions, and on the relative outrageousness of actions within any
one category. Individuals and commissions that set penalties are likely to
respect this ordering both for psychological reasons-it corresponds to their
moral intuitions as well as to the intuitions of the public-and for political
reasons: Setting punishments that transparently violate the common ranking of
"punishable merit" within a category will appear unjust and evoke resistance.
In this situation as well, we argue, category-bound thinking and the problem of
translating punitive intent into dollars or other penalties combine to produce
global incoherence.
A. Punitive Intent: Determinants and Expressions
We divide the task of setting punishment into two parts:
1) the determination of punitive intent, understood as the desire to punish,
which locates the appropriate punishment on a subjective scale that ranges
from "no punishment at all" to "extremely severe punishment."
2) the translation of punitive intent into a metric that can actually be used by
the legal system, such as dollars of fine or years in jail.
As we shall show, some forms of incoherence arise at the level of punitive
intent, while others are caused by features of the translation process.
Social psychologists commonly identify an emotion and a tendency to
action as elements of attitudes.44 In our usage, outrage is the emotion and
punitive intent is the action tendency. We believe that they are directly related.
Outrage and punitive intent both are psychological variables-along with other
subjective variables such as brightness, loudness, pain, trust, and dislike. Any
subjective variable can be expressed in multiple ways. For example, outrage
may be expressed by appropriate adjectives, by the choice of a number on a
rating scale, by loud screams, or by jail sentences.
44. See ALICE H. EAGLY & SHELLY CHAIKEN, THE PSYCHOLOGY OFATrrUrDES (1993).
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The existence of something like a moral community is assumed in the
analysis that follows. When we speak of the outrageousness of an action or the
punitive intention that is evoked by it, we have in mind an emotional state and
a tendency to act that are widely shared in a relevant community. Consensus in
moral attitudes was demonstrated in an earlier study45 in which respondents
(drawn from jury-eligible citizens in Travis County, Texas) were asked to
evaluate product liability cases involving physical injuries. Different groups of
respondents used different scales in these evaluations. Some evaluated the
outrageousness of the defendant's behavior (always a firm, also identified by
annual profit as an indication of its size) using a rating scale (from "Completely
Acceptable" to "Absolutely Outrageous"); others rated their punitive intent,
also on a rating scale (from "No Punishment" to "Extremely Severe
Punishment"). A third group assessed the appropriate amount of punitive
damages, in dollars.
We found substantial consensus in these judgments. Thus, on average, rich
and poor; educated and less educated; white, Hispanic, and African-American;
old and young; male and female; and all others are likely to agree on how to
rank and rate a set of personal injury cases in terms of their "punishable
merit,"46 the outrageousness of the defendant's conduct, and the punitive
damages that are appropriate.47 Note that the agreement is between the average
judgments for the various social groups. There is some variability in
judgments of each case within each group, and especially for judgments made
in dollars. In general, however, people appear to agree on what makes one
personal injury worse than another (e.g., amount and duration of pain,
disability, vulnerability of victims such as the elderly and the very young); they
also agree on elements of the defendant's behavior (e.g., intentionality,
deception) that make one reprehensible action worse than another; and they
agree as well on the severity of the harm inflicted on the plaintiff-provided
that comparisons are restricted to harms of a particular type, such as physical
injury.
An analysis of the results of our study showed that the punitive awards
assessed for twenty-eight separate scenarios were predicted quite accurately by
a very simple formula, which captures the psychological conception of
punishment that we apply and extend in this article:48
45. The results are reported in Sunstein et al., supra note 3, and in Kahneman et al.,
supra note 17.
46. See Breyer, supra note 1.
47. See Kahneman et al., supra note 17, at 61-62 & tbl.5; Sunstein et al., supra note 3,
at 2097-100 & tbl.1.
48. The results of this analysis are described by Kahneman & Frederick, supra note 40.
The severity of the harm associated with each of the scenarios used in Kahneman et al.,
supra note 17, was rated by a small group of Princeton students, who were not given any
details about the cause of the harm.
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Punishment ($) = Outrageousness x Severity x Translation
of behavior of harm factor
What this formula says is that punitive intent is proportional to the
outrageousness of the harmful action, and that punitive intent is also
proportional to the severity of the harm. The translation factor is required to
transform punitive intent-here construed as a state of mind-into actual
punishments.
Punitive intent, as this formula indicates, is firmly retributive, in the sense
that both the act and its consequences matter.49 Because of the retributive
nature of the underlying intuitions, the public sense of what is just punishment
is radically at odds with the idea, popular in some academic circles, that
punishment should be grounded largely in its deterrent function, and therefore
directly linked to the likelihood that an act will be discovered and punished.50
Punishments that appear just in this society are based on outrage directed at the
action and concern with the degree of harm that the action caused.51
B. The Translation Problem
We have described punitive intent as a state of mind-a sense that it is
right for a miscreant to suffer some degree of pain. Punitive intent can be
expressed in words, such as "severe" or "mild." To have an effect in the real
world, however, the intention to punish must be translated onto a scale that can
be used by the legal system, such as dollars of fine or months in jail. The
translation factor in the formula above represents this operation of scaling.
For many classes of harms, people lack shared moral intuitions that might
specify the translation factor. Except to the extent that they are familiar with
existing practice, people do not have a clear, agreed-upon sense that a grossly
49. See generally Jonathan Baron & Ilana Ritov, Intuitions About Penalties and
Compensation in the Context of Tort Law, 7 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 17 (1993) (finding that
subjects' intuitions about punishment, in the tort context, tend to rest not on a deterrence
principle, but rather on nonconsequentialist attitudes).
50. On the economic view, a reckless act that would inevitably be discovered and
compensated for should not be punished with punitive damages, whereas a similar act with a
50% chance of discovery should be punished with an award equal to the compensation
award. Sunstein et al., supra note 3, at 2111-12, report that probability of detection is
largely irrelevant to intuitions about just punishment. Punishment that is deliberately
calibrated by probability of detection is considered unjust when it results in similar actions
being punished differently in different localities. Baron and Ritov, supra note 49, at 23-24,
report that knowledge of the explicitly specified future impact of a decision does not
substantially affect judgment, even of experts, although regulating future behavior is a
critical factor in the theory of law and economics.
51. See Sunstein et al., supra note 38; see also Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool
Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, (2001) ("[I]t is clear that juries do not normally engage in such a
finely tuned exercise of deterrence calibration ... ").
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reckless action should be punished with a punitive award of $50,000, or
$100,000, or $1,000,000, or that a case of assault should be punished with ajail
term of six months, two years, or five years. As a consequence, the translation
factor that is used is often influenced by irrelevant considerations, personal
experience, and random circumstances. In the case of punitive damage awards,
for example, the plaintiff s demand matters a great deal, simply because juries
often have few other relevant dollar figures from which to begin.5 2  And
because of the influence of these irrelevant considerations and random
circumstances, actual punishments for transgressions are often incoherent in
our sense. That is, different juries, who agree on punitive intent for a given set
of facts, may impose substantially different punishments solely because of
arbitrary differences in their translation factors. These propositions have direct
implications for a wide range of tasks relevant to the law. They apply with
equal force to the determination of punishment for individual cases and to the
writing of statutes or regulations that specify punishments for particular
transgressions.
Optimal deterrence theory offers a way of calculating the appropriate
punishments, again by connecting dollar awards to the harm through the
translation factor of "likelihood of compensation. '53 But we have'already seen
that this analysis violates common intuitions about just punishment.54 For
those who seek to come up with dollar amounts that are intuitively appealing, a
main difficulty is that harm and punishment do not generally occur in the same
or even in commensurable units. What is the appropriate fine for hunting an
endangered bird? $50? $500? $5000? Should the punitive damages for a case
of employment discrimination be set at three times the value of compensatory
damages, or at fifteen times that value?
In an earlier analysis of punitive damages we focused on the arbitrariness
of translation factors as a major cause of the notorious unpredictability of
punitive damage awards.55 We expected, and found, large variations in the
52. See Reid Hastie, David A. Schkade & John W. Payne, Juror Judgments in Civil
Cases: Effects of Plaintiff's Requests and Plaintiffs Identity on Punitive Damage Awards,
23 LAW & HUM. BEHAv. 445 (1999); see also Gretchen B. Chapman & Brian H. Bornstein,
The More You Ask for, the More You Get: Anchoring in Personal Injury Verdicts, 10
APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 519 (1996) (finding similar effects of plaintiff's demand in
the context of compensatory awards for personal injury).
53. See A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic
Analysis, 111 HARV. L. REV. 869, 873-76 (1998).
54. See Sunstein et al., supra note 38 (quoted in Cooper, 532 U.S. at 439).
55. See Sunstein et al., supra note 3, at 2106-07. We described the juror's task as a
special case of scaling without a modulus. The term is borrowed from psychological
experiments in which observers use numbers to indicate the intensity of sensations such as
brightness, loudness, or pain. The common practice in such scaling experiments is to specify
a particular stimulus (e.g., a level of luminance) as a standard. Observers are instructed to
assign a particular number (the modulus) to that stimulus, and to assign numbers to other
stimuli by comparing them to the subjective intensity associated with the standard. The task
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translation factor that people will apply in judging a particular case, even when
their punitive intent is the same. In subsequent research we found that jury
deliberations are not a cure for the variability of translation factors. 6 The
general effect of deliberation was instead a severity shift: It appears that when
jurors start off with different translation factors, higher punishments that are
proposed in the deliberation are more likely to be adopted, and are sometimes
even exceeded by the jury's award. Even after deliberation, different mock
juries considering the same case often reach radically different decisions-
punitive damage awards sometimes vary by a factor of 100 or more.5 7
It is easy to see that free-floating translation factors will often cause
failures of our test of incoherence. Imagine two juries that consider separate
claims A and B against the same defendant, awarding $1 million for case A and
$5 million for case B. Because the translation factor that each applies may be
different, it is entirely possible that both juries, if asked to compare the two
cases, would agree that case A is higher in "punishable merit" than case B.
The inevitable consequence of variability in the translation factor is
incoherence in punishments: Different individuals and different juries will
make judgments that cannot be reconciled, even in the presence of underlying
consensus on punitive intent.
We do not intend to imply that the translation factors that people apply are
completely arbitrary. Indeed, data that we have reported demonstrate the
opposite. In one of our earlier studies 8 of punitive damages, each case was
presented in two versions that differed only in the annual profits of the
defendant firm. For example, this value was "$10-20 million" in one version
and "$100-200 million" in another. The indication of the size of the defendant
firm had a large and systematic effect on punitive awards, which were
substantially higher for larger firms. The mechanism that produces this effect
is most likely the same that produces anchoring of awards on irrelevant factors.
In this instance, however, the effect of firm size on awards corresponds to the
widespread intuition that a larger financial punishment is required to inflict the
same level of "pain" if the defendant firm is large than if it is small. Other
anchoring effects could be defended as well: Punitive awards have been found
may appear meaningless, but in fact it is one that people can carry out with fair agreement-
much like the consensus they exhibit in judging the severity of harms or the outrageousness
of behaviors. In some experiments, however, a modulus is not supplied, and the observers
are requested to assign whatever numbers they feel appropriate to report the subjective
intensity of their sensations. In such situations of scaling without a modulus, observers
spontaneously adopt their own individual standard and apply it consistently. However,
different observers choose different moduli for no apparent reason. Thus, two stimuli may
be rated as 10 and 2 by one individual, and as 40 and 8 by another, simply because the
second individual picked a modulus that is four times larger than the first.
56. See Schkade et al., supra note 38.
57. See id. at 1159 tbl.6.
58. Kahneman et al., supra note 17.
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to be strongly correlated with compensatory awards in the same case,59 and
perhaps anchoring of punitive on compensatory awards could be justified as
appropriate, though this would not be an entirely easy task.60
C. Categories and Frames of Reference
In this article we study two manifestations of category-bound thinking that
produce incoherence in punishments: (1) The frame of reference for judging
harmful actions is linked to a category of harms, and therefore liable to change
when cases that involve harms of different kinds are explicitly compared; and
(2) the institutions that set penalties for categories of misconduct appear to be
unconcerned with the penalties already on the books for other categories. In
both situations, we suggest that judgments seem sensible and coherent within
each category separately, but not when the viewscreen is expanded to include
more than one category. To understand this suggestion, and the mechanisms
that produce judgment reversals, it is necessary to know something about what
categories are and how they operate.
The term "category," as used in this article, is borrowed from modem
cognitive science, where it serves to explain how people use categories and
category labels in informal reasoning and in everyday language.61  This
approach to categories and categorization is quite different from an approach in
which a category is defined by a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for
membership. In that system, the boundaries between categories are sharp and
membership is all-or-none. In everyday language, in contrast, the boundaries
of categories are fuzzy and membership is graded.62 A chicken is surely a bird,
but is not quite as good a bird as a robin or an eagle. And a whale is not a fish,
but it is a bird even less. Indeed, the habit of thinking in terms of fuzzy
categories and graded membership is so deeply ingrained that it explains the
59. Theodore Eisenberg, John Goerdt, Brian Ostrom, David Rottman & Martin T.
Wells, The Predictability of Punitive Damages, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 623, 650-52 (1997).
60. It would not be easy on any theory of punitive damages. On optimal deterrence
theory, a key issue is the multiplier the compensatory award is in some sense an anchor, but
a weak one, because a 100% likelihood of compensation should produce a punitive award of
zero, and a 50% likelihood of compensation should produce a punitive award two times that
of the compensatory award. On the retributive view, there is no obvious translation formula,
and it is hardly clear that the same retribution should be applied when an especially
egregious harm has been imposed (say, an intentional battery of a child, producing a
compensatory award of $100,000) as when a far less egregious harm, with the same
compensatory award, has been imposed (say, a reckless act of ecological harm, producing a
compensatory award of $100,000).
61. See, e.g., DANIEL REISBERG, CoGNrrIoN: EXPLORING THE SCIENCE OF MIND ch.8
(1997); LAWRENCE W. BARSALOU, COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY: AN OVERVIEV FOR COGNITIVE
ScIENTIsTs ch.2 (1992).
62. See BARSALOU, supra note 61, ch.2; Eleanor Rosch, Carolyn B. Mervis, Wayne D.
Gray, David M. Johnson & Penny Boyes-Braem, Basic Objects in Natural Categories, 8
CoGNITIvEPSYCHOL. 382 (1976).
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documented difficulties of juries in conforming to judges' instructions about
verdicts that are defined by necessary and sufficient conditions.63 Of course, no
one would wish to claim that people are incapable of thinking in terms of
necessary and sufficient conditions for category membership. This mode of
thinking is dominant in mathematics and in scientific reasoning, and at least
implicitly in some domains of law as well; consider the question of whether
speech can be regulated as "obscene."64
Any object or event is a member of innumerable categories (for example,
the category of things that are not Julius Caesar). But questions that require a
judgment reveal that categorization follows rules that are widely shared and
quite predictable. Consider the questions "is an eagle large?" and "is a cabin
small?" The expected answer to both questions, when separately presented, is
"yes." The categories of birds and buildings were not mentioned in the
questions, but they are evoked in the respondent's mind, and they are
automatically used to provide a frame of reference for the otherwise ambiguous
questions about the objects' sizes. We will say that the judgments are
spontaneously normalized to the frame of reference implied by the category.
There are situations in which a judgment can be normalized to a category
that is not associated with a definite category label. Consider the following
example: "John is a six-year-old child whose pajamas caught fire as he was
playing with matches. The boy was badly burned over a significant portion of
his body and required several weeks in hospital and months of physical
therapy. How would you describe the harm that was caused in this incident?
Extremely severe? Severe? Mild?" At first glance, this question may appear
impossible to answer without specifying a frame of reference. Remarkably,
most people do not find this task meaningless or even particularly difficult.
They will readily generate judgments that will cluster around "very severe."
Evidently, people evaluate a case as mild or severe relative to an ad hoc frame
of reference, which consists of similar examples that spontaneously come to
mind. In the case at hand, we suspect that the categories that people construct
correspond fairly closely to the class of "injuries that occur in household
accidents," and we also suspect that they do not explicitly label the category as
such.
The judgments that people make without a specified frame of reference are
nevertheless quite orderly. A story about an elderly woman who slipped in a
bathtub and sprained her ankle will elicit substantially milder judgments.
Furthermore, the fact that people generally agree closely in their judgments
suggests that the informal categories that people construct around any given
63. For an example with punitive damage instructions, see Reid Hastie, David A.
Schkade & John W. Payne, A Study of Juror and Jury Judgments in Civil Cayes: Deciding
Liability for Punitive Damages, 22 LAW & HULM. BEHAv. 287 (1998).
64. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (announcing "basic
[constitutional] guidelines for the trier of fact in obscenity cases").
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case are quite similar. The boundaries of these informal categories are
undoubtedly fuzzy, and they include cases that differ along many dimensions,
such as the permanent loss of four fingers or several months of complete
blindness. We can be certain, however, that other harms, such the destruction
of a reputation, or a drop in the population of dolphins, will not come to mind
when the case of the burned child is considered. Similarly, cases of damage to
reputations or to species will each evoke their own frame of reference, which
will not include personal injuries. The meanings of words such as "mild" or
"severe" will be normalized to each of these fuzzy categories.
Normalization in the use of adjectives is a simple convention of language
that usually causes no serious problems of communication. But there is a
separate phenomenon, one of considerable importance to psychology and law:
Normalization is also found in emotional reactions, in punitive intentions, and
in actualpunishments. Consider the behavior of a guest at a formal dinner who
pushed his plate away in obvious distaste, while muttering a derogatory
comment about the hostess. Casual observation suggests that intense emotions
of indignation can be evoked by such rude behavior, not only in the victimized
hosts but also in observers. The intensity of these feelings might well be
greater than that created by actions such as misdeeds by public officials, which
cause much graver harms but are normalized to a different category. In an
explicit comparison, of course, everyone will agree that something is
inappropriate about reactions of outrage that are more intense for trivial
misconduct than for genuine malfeasance. The relativity of the emotion of
outrage is important to our story about law, because we argue that outrage and
punitive intent are closely linked in the moral attitudes of most people, and are
directly expressed in actual punishments.65 As we now show, the normalization
of outrage is a significant source of incoherent punishments.
Recall the minimal criterion for coherence that we apply here: Is the
ranking of two or more cases the same when they are directly compared and
when they are judged in isolation? Note that this criterion is likely to be met
for objects that belong to the same category. Judged separately, bums over
much of the body appear severe and a sprained ankle appears mild. The
ranking of the two harms will not change when the two cases are directly
compared, because the frames of reference were the same to begin with. When
harms of the same general kind are caused by misconduct, we expect outrage
and punishments to pass the test of coherence. Normalization occurs, but it
does not produce incoherence.
The risk of incoherence arises when the judgments made separately and in
direct comparison involve different categories, and therefore different frames
of reference. First, comparisons across categories of harms are particularly
difficult because they are not easily described in the same language. To
appreciate the difficulty, consider an action that led to one person losing four
65. See Sunstein et al., supra note 3; Kahneman et al., supra note 17.
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fingers and also to the death of twenty-five migratory birds. The comparison of
these harms involves complexities of a different order from within-category
comparisons. The difficulties of cross-category comparisons inevitably lead to
instability in the judgments of individuals, and to an impairment of consensus,
relative to within-category comparisons. 66
What causes this more systematic form of incoherence? The reason is that
comparison across categories introduces features that are relevant to the
judgment, but not given adequate weight when cases are considered in
isolation.67 We believe, without formal evidence, that there is substantial
agreement on comparisons between categories in terms of a vaguely defined
but well understood dimension sometimes called "prominence" in the
psychological literature. 6s For example, physical injury is more prominent than
financial injury, and harm to people is more prominent than harm to other
biological species. Because of normalization, the relative prominence of
categories of harm plays no role when these harms are judged in isolation. But
because the features that distinguish categories become very salient in a
comparison, incoherence is an inevitable consequence.69  We test this
proposition in the experiment described below.
IV. A STUDY OF NORMALIZATION AND INCOHERENCE
To illustrate the judgment reversals produced by category-bound thinking
and by the process of normalization, we consider two different evaluation
tasks, one involving punitive damage awards and one contingent valuation of
public goods. Both punitive damage awards and contingent valuation have
been highly controversial in recent years.70 We will present evidence of
judgment reversals in each context.
66. We have collected data on this topic that confirms the difficulty of cross-category
comparisons in the context of punitive damage cases involving different types of harm. See
Cass R. Sunstein, Daniel Kahneman, David Schkade & Ilana Ritov, Legal Coherence and
Incoherence (2000) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Stanford Law Review).
67. Ilana Ritov, The Role of Expectations in Comparisons, 107 PSYCHOL. REv. 345
(2000).
68. Amos Tversky, Shmuel Sattath & Paul Slovic, Contingent Weighting in Judgment
and Choice, 95 PSYCHOL. REv. 371 (1988).
69. Dedre Gentner & Arthur B. Markman, Structural Alignment in Comparison: No
Difference Without Similarity, 5 PSYCHOL. SCI. 152 (1994); Arthur B. Markman & Douglas
L. Medin, Similarity and Alignment in Choice, 63 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HuM.
DECISION PROCESSES 117 (1995).
70. On punitive damages, see, e.g., Symposium, The Future of Punitive Damages,
1998 WIsc. L. REv. 1 (1998). On contingent valuation, see, e.g., Symposium, Contingent
Valuation, 8 J. ECON. PERSP. 3 (1994).
1173
HeinOnline  -- 54 Stan. L. Rev. 1173 2001-2002
STANFORD LAWREVIEW[
A. Hypothesis and Design
Our central question was whether people's assessments would differ
depending on whether they viewed a problem in isolation (separate evaluation)
or in comparison to a problem from a different category (cross-category
comparison). The problems we used are drawn from categories of harm that
differ in prominence (physical injury vs. financial loss; harm to human beings
vs. harm to the ecosystem71). Our central hypothesis was that when a problem
is viewed in isolation, judgments are normalized within the relevant category,
but that this normalization is prevented when a comparison to a problem from a
different category is required. Instead, differences between categories will
dominate the consideration. We therefore expected problems drawn from
categories involving the worse type of harm to evoke higher judgments (larger
punitive awards, higher willingness to pay) in comparative than in isolated
evaluations.
We asked a large group of people to consider pairs of legal cases and of
public causes (see Table 1).72 Each pair of legal cases consisted of one case of
physical injury and one case of financial loss. 73 Each pair of public causes
consisted of one threat to human health and one threat to the environment.74
Some people made their evaluations on a dollar scale and others on rating
scales.
After evaluating one case and one cause in isolation, people saw the paired
case and cause, which they were asked to compare to the one they had already
seen (see Appendices A, B and C). For example, for legal pair A, they were
asked, "Compared to the manufacturer of childproof safety caps, how much
punishment does the company that sold repainted cars as new deserve?" and for
Pair D of public causes, "Compared to protecting coral reefs, how much money
would you be willing to contribute to a fund for farm workers skin cancer?".
After answering this question by circling "less than," "more than," or "the
same," participants also evaluated the new item on the same scale they used in
making judgments in isolation.
71. It might be objected here that everything depends on the degree of harm: A trivial
physical injury is not as bad as a huge financial loss. We agree. We are suggesting only that
the categories, as such, are ranked, and ranked in the way that we describe.
72. Jury-eligible citizens from Travis County, Texas (n = 1035) were recruited by a
survey firm and paid for their participation. All respondents received detailed instructions
about the task of jurors in civil cases and the criteria for punitive damages. These
instructions are presented in part in Appendix A.
73. Each case was a short summary (200 words) of a realistic incident, in which the
defendant was always a large company described as having "annual profits of around $150
million." Respondents were told to assume that $500,000 in compensatory damages had
already been awarded to the plaintiff, and that the case had reached the stage of determining
whether punitive damages were appropriate, and if so, in what amount. A financial loss and
physical injury pair is presented in Appendix B.
74. Each threat and a proposed mitigating intervention was described in a paragraph of
text. A public cause pair is presented in Appendix C.
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Table 1. Summary of Problems
Legal Cases
Physical Harm Financial Harm
A Childproof safety cap fails; Repainted cars sold as new to
child needs hospital stay leasing agency
B Patient injured when surgeon Distributor violates contract,
ignores standard safety rules damaging supplier's business
C Driver injured when defective Trustee manipulates trust to
steering system fails enrich a favored client
Public Causes
Harm to Humans
D Program to improve detection
of skin cancer in farm workers
E Research on a type of bone
marrow cancer in the elderly
F Program to replace lead-based
paint in low income areas
Harm to the Environment
Fund to clean up and protect
dolphin breeding locations
Fund to protect coral reefs by
banning cyanide fishing
Fund to protect elephants from
ivory poachers
B. Findings
The four panels of Figure 1 present our results, pooled over the three pairs
of legal cases and public causes.75 The Figure shows unambiguous shifts of
judgment, depending on whether a problem is viewed in isolation or in the
context of a problem from a different category. The pattern of shifts is just the
75. Each person was randomly assigned to one legal pair and to one public cause pair.
One third of the participants responded on rating scales and the other two thirds on dollar
scales. For the punitive damage cases, the rating scale was the appropriate severity of
punishment, ranging from zero ("no punishment") to eight ("extremely severe punishment").
The dollar scale was the amount of punitive damages that the defendant should be required
to pay. For public causes, the rating scale was the satisfaction that individuals would derive
from contributing to the cause, ranging from zero ("no satisfaction at all") to six ("extreme
satisfaction"). The dollar scale was the maximum amount that they would be willing to
contribute to the cause (denoted below as WTP-willingness to pay).
Pair
Pair
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one we predicted from a process of normalization: When cases from categories
that differ in prominence are viewed in isolation, the effect of the category is
suppressed. As a result, the more prominent harm is assigned a lower rating
and a lower dollar value when judged by itself than when directly compared to
a harm of a less prominent kind. The pattern of results is strikingly similar for
ratings on bounded scales and for dollar responses. It is also precisely the same
for responses to harms that are to be punished (civil suits) and for harms that
are to be prevented or remedied (public causes).
Figure 1. Aggregate Evaluations Over Cases or Causes for
Rating and Dollar Responses
Note also that when cases are compared across categories of harm, the
evaluation of the more prominent item rises sharply, while that of the less
prominent item declines slightly or stays about the same.76 The asymmetric
76. This pattern is confirmed by analysis-the interaction of Evaluation Mode
(separate evaluation vs. cross-category comparison) and Item Type (e.g., financial vs.
personal injury) is evident and statistically significant in all four panels (each p <.001).
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effects of the comparison on more and on less prominent harms reflects a
cognitive phenomenon that is well understood, but not central to our story.77
Measured in dollars, the shifts illustrated in Figure 1 are quite substantial.
Averaging over the three personal injury cases, the median dollar award rose
from $1 million in separate evaluation to $2.25 million when they were directly
compared to cases of financial harm. The median dollar award increased from
separate to cross-category evaluation for all three personal injury cases. At the
same time, the median award did not change significantly for any of the three
financial cases. The shifts in willingness to pay-which in standard contingent
valuation practice would be translated into estimates of the value of the
goods-are also substantial.
The similarity of results for ratings and dollar awards is particularly
noteworthy. As our discussion of eagles and cabins showed, category-bound
shifts in the meaning of adjectives are expected as a convention of language.
But dollars, like centimeters, are objective units that are supposed to retain the
same meaning across contexts. An individual who said an eagle is large and a
cabin is small has no cause for embarrassment, but an individual who estimates
the size of eagles and cabins in metric units is supposed to make estimates that
are absolute, not category-relative. (We would want to pose some questions to
anyone who insists that eagles are really bigger than cabins.) Likewise, jurors
who assess punishments in dollars are supposed to use an absolute scale, and
their judgments should not be different from those they would make in the
context of a comparison with a different type of misconduct. Similarly, the
standard interpretation of stated willingness-to-pay as a measure of the value of
public goods assumes that these statements provide an absolute measure of
these goods, but the sensitivity of WTP to the judgment context casts doubt on
this essential assumption.
The similarity of the results for ratings and for dollar values also provides
support for another claim we have made earlier about both punitive damages
and contingent valuation.7 We have argued that punitive awards and
statements of willingness to pay are direct expressions of an emotional
response: outrage in the case of harm caused by one person to another, and the
fear and hope associated with the possibility of preventing or undoing harm to
people, or to aspects of the ecosystem. But we have also added a crucial
77. Psychological research indicates that comparison of two objects is not a symmetric
process: One object (the subject) is compared to another (the referent). In the present
design, the problem presented in the first envelope was the referent to which the second item
was compared. Evidence from other studies indicates that the perceived contrast between
two objects is greater when the more prominent of them is the topic of the comparison. For
example, China is more different from North Korea than North Korea is from China. See
Amos Tversky, Features of Similarity, 84 PSYCHOL. Ray. 327 (1977). In the present
instance, this process would cause a greater effect in making the more prominent harm look
worse than in reducing the significance of the less prominent one.
78. Kalneman et al., supra note 18.
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element here, which we infer from the shifts in dollar responses. Emotional
responses, no less than the responses in dollars, are category-bound and
context-dependent. The emotion itself will vary, depending on whether a case
or problem is considered in isolation or compared to a case or problem from a
different category.
C. Some Speculations
The normalization effect that we documented in this study has other
implications as well. In particular, the results suggest that the contingent
valuation approach is likely to distort the relative willingness of the public to
deal with threats to the environment and with threats to people, unless steps are
taken to overcome the problems identified here. And if people's informed
judgments are taken to be the criterion, punitive damage awards are likely to be
too high in financial injury cases and too low in personal injury cases. Some
data supports this suggestion. 9 We expect that similar shifts could be
documented with many other pairs of categories. For example, we suspect that
punitive damages awards involving libel might well be higher, in isolation,
than punitive damage awards involving racial discrimination; but there is likely
to be a reversal if the two cases are put together.
In the theory that we have proposed, normalization reduces the differences
in the overall level of outrage that is evoked by misconduct that causes
different kinds of harms. The comparison of cases drawn from different
categories restores differences between categories of harms that differ in
prominence, and in most cases, this should be considered an improvement in
the quality of judgment. We hypothesize that the comparative situation may
alter judgments in another way, by reducing the anchoring effects of
compensatory damages on punitive awards.80 In the real world of punitive
damages, unlike our experiment, compensatory awards are generally much
larger in financial cases than in cases of physical injury."' In this pair of
categories, the anchoring effects favor large judgments for the less prominent
harm. As a consequence, a case of financial damage with a large compensatory
anchor (say $10,000,000) is expected to receive a higher punitive damage
award than a case of physical injury with a smaller anchor (say $500,000),
when the two are judged in isolation. When cases of the two kinds are directly
compared, we expect that many people will be more strongly influenced by the
79. See Jonathan M. Karpoff& John R Lott, Jr., On the Determinants and Importance
ofPunitive DamageAwards, 42 J.L. & EcoN. 527, 539 (1999).
80. See Eisenberg, et al., supra note 59. Note that the function of an anchor is similar
to the function of a modulus in psychophysical judgments.
81. See Karpoff & Lott, supra note 79, at 538-39 (showing mean awards of $14.8
million in fraud cases, and $20.6 million in business negligence cases, but $6.2 million in
product liability cases, $1.6 million in malpractice cases, and $991,000 in motor vehicle
accident cases).
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relative prominence of the harms than by the relative size of the anchors.
Preliminary evidence 2 that we have collected supports this hypothesis, which
suggests that two distinct mechanisms may cause punitive awards for financial
cases to be higher in the current system than they would be if jurors were given
a richer context: anchoring on high dollar numbers and masking of the low
prominence of the category through the effect of normalization.
V. PUNITIVE DAMAGES: IS THERE A PROBLEM? WHAT KIND OF PROBLEM?
If cross-category judgment reversals are likely to be pervasive (as we
believe), the problem of predictable incoherence will appear in many contexts.
In what follows, we speculate on the evidence of incoherence in punitive
damages and on possible reforms that might address the problem. Our
principal message is critical rather than constructive; we claim to have
uncovered a serious problem, not to know how to solve it. Although we will
explore some reform possibilities, our aim is not to endorse a particular
proposal, but to explore the implications of incoherence in moral intuitions for
legal institutions.
Most of what we say here will apply, with suitable variations, to the
assessment of incoherence in other settings, such as contingent valuation,
administrative penalties, and civil and criminal fines. In Parts VI, VII, and
VIII, we turn to some broader speculations.
A. Can Coherence Be Achieved?
We have observed that people's judgments about appropriate punitive
awards are very different, depending on whether they see a case in isolation or
in comparison to another case. We also believe that most people, in most
conditions, prefer a wide viewscreen to a narrow one, and will in principle
(though not always in actual practice) have greater confidence in the judgments
they make in a broad context than in a narrow context. These points raise
serious questions about the current system, and support a presumption against
the outcomes of one-shot judgments, which occur by design in punitive
damages cases. Furthermore, they suggest a direction for reform. If the
purpose of the institution of the jury is both to elicit the judgments of ordinary
people and to satisfy their wish for justice, there is good reason to search for
ways to prevent or correct outcomes that all or almost all would consider
anomalous when placed in the context of the pattern as a whole. More
ambitiously, we might seek ways of ensuring judgments that fit into a pattern
that ordinary people would find coherent. The achievement of global
coherence is exceedingly difficult, but it has considerable appeal, at least as an
ideal.
82. See Sunstein et a]., supra note 66.
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But any effort to achieve this ideal is open to three major objections. The
most basic is that there is good reason to doubt the very existence of an
underlying system of moral intuitions that is internally consistent. Recent
behavioral studies of human decisionmaking have undermined the hope that
people's choices can be explained in terms of a comprehensive and coherent
'preference order.'83 The evidence suggests that people construct preferences
on the fly, and that their choices are highly dependent on the immediate context
and on inconsequential features of the options they consider. Of course,
choices are not chaotic or random-the decisions that people make have some
consistency and structure, but this structure is better described by the loose
logic of attitude than by the coherent logic of fully rational preferences. 4 This
argument extends directly to moral choices, moral preferences, and moral
intuitions-raising doubts about the feasibility of reflective equilibrium in this
domain.85
Even if the moral intuitions and sentiments of individuals could be
rationalized, there would be a question about the feasibility of a coherent
system that is broadly acceptable across society. We have already mentioned
the hypothesis that social and cultural groups may differ more in their ranking
of categories of harm than in their rankings of harms within each category.86
Obviously, serious problems will be encountered in attempting to achieve
agreement on a system of punishments that incorporates the judgments of
different individuals and groups about all categories-recall the epigraph from
Justice Breyer.
The third objection is that even if the moral intuitions of ordinary people
could be represented as a broadly acceptable and coherent system, it might be
wrong to adopt this system as the final arbiter of issues in law in general, and
of judgments of punitive damages in particular. In some areas, the judgments
of the public might be "impeached," if, for example, it were thought that the
public was too willing to punish libel, and too unwilling to punish racial
discrimination. As we have seen, there is compelling evidence that the popular
conception of justice is more concerned with issues of retribution than with
issues of deterrence. 7 Those who accept the dominant approach in law and
economics, where deterrence is the principal goal of punitive damages,88 are
likely to reject any system in which the probability of detection plays little or
no role in the setting of such damages. On the other hand, of course, there is
83. For multiple sources on this point, see Kahneman & Tversky, supra note 34.
84. Kahneman et al., supra note 18.
85. Daniel Kahneman, Tanner Lecture, University of Michigan (1994) (transcript on
file with author).
86. For example, members of minority groups may rank racial discrimination as more
important than members of the majority, stockholders may rank securities fraud as more
important than non-stockholders, and so forth.
87. See Sunstein et al., supra note 38.
88. See Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 6.
1180 [Vol. 54:1153
HeinOnline  -- 54 Stan. L. Rev. 1180 2001-2002
June 2002] PREDICTABLYINCOHERENT JUDGMENTS
reason to believe that a system of punishments that is exclusively concerned
with deterrence will be considered unjust by the public.
Finally, if all these fundamental objections could be met, further issues of
feasibility would arise. Even if an underlying and comprehensive system of
intuitions exists, the methods of uncovering it do not. There is a limit to the
complexity of cognitive tasks that ordinary people can be asked to do, and
ranking the punishable merit of different kinds of misconduct that cause
different kinds of harms clearly exceeds these limits. Furthermore, the
construction of instruments for eliciting these judgments would inevitably be
questioned for possible bias and other flaws of method.
Thus, the ideal of seeking a system that is both coherent and reflective of
popular moral sentiments can be questioned on both normative and practical
grounds. Nevertheless, we submit that incoherence, once acknowledged, is
unacceptable, even scandalous. Something should be done about it. We next
consider some of the things that may be done. Our emphasis is on finding
ways to correct obvious errors, which is a realistic goal, rather than on
producing what all would agree to be coherent, a goal that seems, in light of
what we have just said, to be unduly ambitious.
B. Reforms
Consider the following reform possibilities: (a) asking the jury to look at
cases from more than one category of harms; (b) increasing judicial control
over awards, on the theory that judges are likely to have an implicit comparison
set in view and could be required to make explicit comparisons; and (c)
transferring some or all of the relevant tasks to a bureaucracy, which might
create and operate a kind of "damage schedule" for conduct calling for punitive
awards of some kind.
1. Comparisons before the jury.
It is tempting to think that the best response to what we have shown is
simply to provide jurors with information about cases in more than one
category of harms, so as to overcome the global incoherence that results from
isolated judgments. But a moment's reflection should suffice to show that this
is not a sensible solution.
The first problem involves cognitive overload. Would specific cases be
shown to the jury? From which categories? In what detail? Obviously it
would be absurd to try to provide jurors with all cases from all categories. But
any small set of comparison cases would seem, and inevitably be, arbitrary.
The second problem involves the risk of manipulation, whether inadvertent or
intentional. It would be easy, on the basis of our findings here, to select a
category that would drive up both outrage and dollar awards, or drive them
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down. A lack of a comparative context is indeed a problem, but comparisons
before the jury are not a realistic response.
2. Increased judicial control: additur, remittitur, and others.
A more promising strategy for reducing incoherence would be to give
relatively greater power to the reviewing court and relatively less power to the
jury. The basic idea would be that judges are in a better position to move
toward global coherence, or at least to avoid the worst anomalies. To be sure,
we have said that people are not likely to agree about what pattern of results
would really represent "global coherence," and it is possible that judges' views
would diverge from those of juries or the public at large. All we are suggesting
is that a greater role for judges could produce progress by everyone's lights, if
the basic goal is to avoid the most serious misjudgments.
A tempting motivation for this reform would be that by virtue of their
experience, judges have a larger implicit comparison set. Having seen a wide
range of cases, judges might seem likely to know that a punitive damage
judgment of, say, $400 million for commercial fraud, or $50,000 for pain and
suffering associated with an eight-month hospital stay produced by reckless
behavior, is extremely odd when compared to cases falling in other categories.
Indeed, the old practice of remittitur, allowing judges to reduce excessive
awards, can be understood as an effort to ensure more in the way of global
coherence. But there is reason to think that implicit comparison sets are not
enough, and that because judges are human, 9 steps must be taken to counteract
the natural tendency to make category-bound judgments. For the process to
work, judges must be required to make such comparisons; left to their own
devices, they might not do so, or make comparisons only to an idiosyncratic or
ad hoe set of cases. In fact, courts have expressly suggested that appellate
review of awards should be conducted by examining comparison cases, in an
effort to promote global coherence.90 To be sure, these suggestions have been
89. There is mounting evidence that judges are subject to the same cognitive processes
as everyone else. See, e.g., Guthrie et al., supra note 12.
90. Martell v. Boardwalk Enters., Inc., 748 F.2d 740, 752-53, 755 (2d Cir. 1984);
Geressy v. Digital Equip. Corp., 980 F. Supp. 640, 657-60 (E.D.N.Y. 1997). Cf. Cooper v.
Leatherman, 532 U.S. 424, (2001).
Differences in the institutional competence of trial judges and appellate judges are consistent
with our conclusion. In Gore, we instructed courts evaluating a punitive damages award's
consistency with due process to consider three criteria: (I) the degree or reprehensibility of
the defendant's misconduct, (2) the disparity between the harm (or potential harm) suffered
by the plaintiff and the punitive damages award, and (3) the difference between the punitive
damages awarded by the jury and the civil penalties authorized or imposed in comparable
cases. Only with respect to the first Gore inquiry do the district courts have a somewhat
superior vantage over courts of appeals, and even then the advantage exists primarily with
respect to issues turning on witness credibility and demeanor. Trial courts and appellate
courts seem equally capable of analyzing the second factor. And the third Gore criterion,
which calls for a broad legal comparison, seems more suited to the expertise of appellate
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limited to within-category comparisons, but there is good reason to be more
ambitious, so as to counteract the problems identified here. We shall return to
this point below, in connection with the idea of sentencing guidelines and the
goal of decreasing incoherence in criminal sentencing.
What we have said supports the practice not only of remittitur but of
additur as well, through which appellate courts increase awards that are shown
to be too low. Undoubtedly some judgments are now insufficiently severe in
light of judgments in other categories, and if reducing incoherence is the goal,
it would be a good idea to ensure that judges increase those awards. It is most
unfortunate that the right to trial by jury is now taken to forbid additur in
federal court.9' We suggest that when they can, judges should use additur and
remittitur more self-consciously as efforts to correct judgments that are
anomalous when placed in the context of other outcomes. Indeed, our findings
provide more general support for the view that judges should take a stronger
hand in overseeing both high and low awards, on the theory that the predictable
incoherence of one-shot jury judgments undermines the populist credentials of
those awards. If ordinary people would themselves deem those judgments
incoherent, why should judges be unwilling to disturb them? Of course, there
would be some social cost to keeping the institution of the jury while also
reducing its authority; and those who believe that the civil jury is an important
social institution will be skeptical of any effort to reduce its role.
There is an independent concern. If judges have predictable prejudices-
if, for example, they are systematically, and improperly, pro-defendant in some
cases-the argument for increasing judicial control is greatly weakened. We
should be willing to tolerate a degree of predictable incoherence if this is the
price of avoiding a (coherent) set of biased and unjust awards. Coherence is
not a trumping value. And indeed there is some thought that judges are less
willing to award punitive damages at all, and also that they tend to impose
systematically lower awards than juries.92 Of course this is not evidence that
judges are biased; perhaps they are right and juries are wrong. But if the
problem lies in judicial bias of some kind or another, there is little reason to
approve of the status quo. The remedy for bias may well lie in attempting to
discipline jury discretion through exemplars or guidelines, modeled perhaps on
the Sentencing Guidelines, designed to impose presumptive floors and ceilings
on awards. This suggestion takes us directly to a final reform strategy.
courts. Considerations of institutional competence therefore fail to tip the balance in favor of
deferential appellate review.
Id. (footnote and citation omitted)
91. Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474 (1935).
92. But see Kevin Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Trial by Jury or Judge:
Transcending Empiricism, 77 CORNELL L. REv. 1124, 1126 (1992) (arguing that in product
liability and medical malpractice cases plaintiffs prevail at higher rates before judges than
before juries, and that in several categories of personal-injury liability the mean recovery is
higher in judge trials).
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3. Bureaucratic rationality.
The most radical response to predictable incoherence would be based on
the idea of bureaucratic rationality. Here the goal would be to create a kind of
"grid" of penalties, matched to the individual facts of diverse cases. As it
arises, each case would be fit into the grid. For punitive damages, for example,
an agency, overseen perhaps by Congress and working with courts or perhaps
entirely independently, might generate a system of financial punishments for
different categories of harm. 3 We have seen that there would be significant
problems in attracting public agreement on any such system, at least if it
attempts to rank harms from diverse categories. But it might well be better to
try to ensure that any ranking exercise is explicit rather than implicit, and that
the ranking that is observed in practice is something better than an artifact of
the cognitive forces that we have discussed here. We will be agnostic here on
the substantive judgments that would go into the resulting outcomes. The
system might be based on optimal deterrence theory; it might be rooted in
retributive intuitions; it might be some kind of mix.
a. Antecedents.
There is nothing new about the idea of producing more sensible ranking
through bureaucratic institutions. Indeed, a great movement of twentieth-
century law has been from case-by-case adjudicative decisions toward a system
of bureaucratic judgment, cabined by rules laid down in advance. The most
familiar example is probably workers' compensation, designed to replace ad
hoe judicial judgments with something more systematic.94 The same kind of
reform can be found in the area of social security disability determinations,
where a high level of inequality in individual judgments produced a system of
"grids" designed to produce greater coherence. 95 The Sentencing Guidelines
were similarly responsive to a perception of incoherent judgments,96 though
there the claim was that criminal sentences were incoherent within as well as
across categories.
b. Current initiatives.
Bureaucratic solutions are not foreign to the areas discussed here. Some
states have moved in this direction with respect to contingent valuation.
93. Of course the institution of the jury would have a smaller role in this system, and
many people will object on that very ground. We do not deal here with the objections that
stress the educative and participatory function of the jury.
94. See FISHBACK & KANTOR, supra note 14.
95. See JERRY MASHAW, BuREAucRAnc JUSTICE (1983).
96. See Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Compromises
Upon Which They Rest, 17 HoFsTRA L. REV. 1, 14-19 (1988).
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Consider, for example, the remarkable approach adopted by the Texas Parks
and Wildlife Department. A regulation is designed to establish values of
injured or destroyed fish, birds, and animals. 97 These values are determined by
assigning a score of 0 to 3 for eight specified "scoring criteria."98 The criteria
include: recreation; aesthetics; education; scarcity; environmental tolerance
(that is, the ability of the species to tolerate changes in climate and so forth);
economics (economic benefit of the species); recruitment (reproductive and
survival capacity); and ecological role. After the individual scores are added to
produce a "total criteria score," that score is multiplied by a "weighting factor"
that relates to the overall demand for the species; the weighting factor ranges
from 1.0 (no additional public demand beyond the eight criteria) to 1.5 (for
scarcity). The adjusted recovery score produces a recovery value for the
species, one that is fully monetized. Special provisions are included for
endangered (an additional payment of $1000) and threatened species (an
additional payment of $500).91
97. See 31 TEx. ADMiN. CODE § 69.20 (West 2001).
98. Id. § 69.22.
99. Pursuant to this rule, the Texas Parks and Wildlife Department has issued a 74-
page document listing monetary equivalents. Consider, for purposes of illustration, the
following excerpt:
Bass, guadalupe, I inch $0.50
Bass, guadalupe, 21 inch $184.19
Mackeral, King, 69 inch $404.60
Shark, Sand, 131 inch $211.81
Mule Deer, F $163
Mule Deer, M $525.50
Sheep, Desert Bighom $2850.00
Prairie Chicken, Attwaters $7100.50
Pheasant $35.50
Jaguar $2850.50
Mountain Lion $525.50
Skunk, stripped $15.50
Whooping Crane $7100.50
Brown Pelican $2850.50
Texas Tortoise $163.00
Deer $1
Loggerhead Turtle $1050.50
Elk $1.00
Texas Rat Snake $3.00
Golden Cheeked Warbler $7100.50
The particular judgments may seem a bit arbitrary; why is an elk worth $1, compared to the
$1050.50 penalty for killing a loggerhead turtle? What is important is that the Texas
provision actually offers an answer to this question, one that is relatively transparent to the
public, and one that ensures that the various values line up with one another along the stated
criteria.
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Punitive damages, assessed in court, can be seen as a substitute for
administrative penalties, and many agencies impose civil penalties via a
method of this kind. As we shall see below, the problem is that agencies tend
to operate in isolation in a way that creates independent risks of global
incoherence; the question is whether the existing system of administrative fines
might itself be rationalized. Consider, as a model in this regard, state systems
for workers' compensation, which explicitly set out damage remedies for
various injuries. Perhaps punitive awards could be made part of a general
schedule of civil penalties.
The strongest objection to a bureaucratic model would be similar to that
raised in the judicial context--distrust of the relevant bureaucrats (or of the
political actors overseeing their operations). If interest-group pressures would
distort judgments, or if the resulting "grid" would contain systematic injustice,
it might be better to continue with a system that contains a degree of
incoherence. But these issues cannot be assessed in the abstract.
Our goal here has not been to argue for any particular reform proposal, but
simply to offer a sense of some of the possibilities. With respect to punitive
damages, we are confident that we have shown a serious, and thus far
unexplored, problem with the existing system. Our emphasis has been on the
avoidance of obvious anomalies, not on the achievement of global coherence.
We are not confident about a plan for reform, in part because of the sheer range
of considerations involved. But we believe that incoherence is a form of
injustice, and that it is unquestionably worthwhile to attempt to find solutions.
VI. ADMINISTRATIVE PENALTIES
In the modem administrative state, civil penalties are not assessed in the
same way as punitive damages. Congress establishes maximum penalties,
generally on a statute-by-statute basis. Congress also establishes enforcement
levels via appropriations. Faced with these constraints, agencies have
considerable room to maneuver, both in choosing the level of the fine (subject
to the statutory maximum) and in deciding whether to bring an enforcement
action and to seek fines in particular cases. On the basis of our findings here,
we hypothesize not that everyone would agree on what a coherent ranking
would look like, but that an investigation of the full range of administrative
penalties would show what many people would see as anomalies-that the set
of penalties actually sought and imposed could not, in the view of most people,
possibly be squared with one another. Those who come up with penalties are
not forced to rationalize the system, in part because people do not
spontaneously call for rationalization, or even attempt to see whether penalties
form a sensible pattern. We attempt to illustrate the problem here by
identifying the statutory maxima and raising questions about whether they
suggest a coherent set of judgments on Congress' part. We can also suggest
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two factors that contribute to the existing situation: category-bound judgments
and the translation problem.
In the context of administrative penalties, category-bound judgments take a
distinctive form. In these situations, legislators or administrators often consider
an entire category at once, such as injuries to wild birds. In such cases, the
emotional response attached to the category label will be of critical importance.
An entire category might be misjudged in separate evaluation (where
misjudgment is understood by reference to people's own beliefs about the
sense or nonsense of the resulting overall pattern). Of course political pressure
can be influential here. As we will see, the punishments for occupational
safety and health violations are relatively light; we are confident that political
pressures are a large part of the reason. But the difficulties that we have
identified-category-bound thinking and the translation problem-are partly
responsible for the incoherence. It would be much harder, politically speaking,
to bias judgments toward an entire category if translation were easy and if
explicit comparisons to another category were brought into the picture.
A. Background
One of the most important movements of the post-New Deal state has been
the emergence of administrative penalties for wrongdoers. If a company or
individual has violated regulations involving occupational safety or protection
of endangered species, some sanction is in order. Often criminal penalties are
deemed too severe for regulatory violations, and civil penalties, in the form of
fines, take up the slack. But what is the appropriate level of such penalties?
What is the proper frame of reference?
1. Overview.
Our starting point is that administrative penalties are generally assigned at
the same time to a set of harms or risks that belong to a single category, in a
process that does not encourage the consideration of other categories of harms
or risks. Adapting the conclusions of our analysis of punitive damage awards
to judgments of categories, we can suggest the following:
" Categories of harms vary in the intensity of the emotions that they
evoke;
* moral intuitions do not specify a scaling factor for the task of
translating punitive intent into dollars;
" there is almost complete consensus on the relative positions of
some categories, and substantial consensus on others;
* because harms from different categories are not transparently
commensurable, a misranking of harms from different categories
is unlikely to attract attention;
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* organizations and individuals setting penalties for categories of
harms consider them one at a time and determine a special
modulus for each occasion.
This list of psychological considerations suggests three hypotheses about
administrative penalties. First, the ranking of harms and penalties within each
category of harms will generally reflect public sentiment. Second, the levels of
penalties for different categories of harms will not necessarily reflect the
ranking of these categories in the public sentiment. Third, incoherence of
penalties for different categories of harm is likely to be tolerated and to persist
over time. As we shall see, each of these hypotheses is confirmed.
2. Politics.
The idea that there is no intuitively compelling way to scale punishments
suggests that political dynamics will play a central role in driving penalties up
or down.' Where interest groups opposing the regulatory scheme are well-
organized, we should expect low penalties; when such groups are poorly
organized, and when those enthusiastic about the regulatory plan have
considerable political power, we should expect severe penalties. 10  The
translation problem compounds the difficulty. Well-organized groups might
well take advantage of the arbitrariness of judgments about appropriate dollar
penalties, simply because the public will have a hard time knowing whether
one or another number is excessive or insufficient-at least if cross-category
comparisons are not made. The translation problem thus creates a lack of
transparency in civil fines, including administrative penalties. A wider
viewscreen would, of course, increase transparency.
There is an independent point. The administrative state is heavily
balkanized, with largely independent institutions engaged in independent tasks,
and with separate congressional committees engaged in oversight. The
Occupational Safety and Health Administration has its own network of duties,
under the auspices of the Department of Labor; so too with the Fish and
Wildlife Service, under the Department of the Interior; and so too with the
Environmental Protection Agency. In an enterprise as enormous as the national
government, some such division of labor seems inevitable. But without a
mechanism for ensuring coherence, the effect of the balkanization, at the level
100. For dramatic evidence, see FISHBACK & KANTOR, supra note 14, at 172-92
(showing how the level at which benefits were set and the terms under which claimants
could recover under the workers' compensation laws of each state were determined in large
part by the relative political strengths of labor unions and employers' groups within each
state's legislature).
101. Id. at 12-14 (noting that workers' compensation legislation was passed in many
state legislatures in no small part because of the active support of powerful employers'
groups that supported the reform because it decreased the unpredictability of their liability to
their employees).
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of committees and regulatory bodies, might well be to produce incoherence, for
the reasons we have traced here.
Does the system of regulatory penalties show the expected pattern of
within-category coherence and cross-category incoherence? In asking that
question, we do not mean to require observers to ask complicated normative
questions about appropriate penalties, but to focus attention on a question
related to that posed in previous sections: If the various penalties are put
together, would ordinary people conclude that the system of penalties makes
little sense? If so, we claim, consistently with what we have urged above, that
the system is unjust, or at least that it contains significant areas of injustice.
B. The Pattern ofPenalties
Consider the following table, capturing a subset of the universe of
administrative penalties (see Appendix D for a fuller version):
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Table 2: Selected Civil Penalties from Administrative
Agencies
Civil!/
Agency Criinal Type of violation Penalty (S)
A Cifriounat
OSHA Civil Violation of a serious nature Up to 7000
Civil Violation of a non-serious nature Up to 7000
Civil Violation of posting requirement Up to 7000
Civil Willful violation if non-serious or regulatory No less than 5000
No less than
Civil Willful violation if serious 25,000
Civil Repeated violations Up to 70,000
Civil Violation of record keeping- reporting Up to 7000
Civil Failure to make requested forms available Up to 3000
Fish and
Wildlife Civil Violation of Wild Bird Conservation Act (WBCA) Up to 25,000
Service
Violation of WBCA § I1 l(a)(1) or (2) importationCivil U o2,0
rules, or violation of § 112 permit rules
Civil Knowing business-related importation under
WBCA § I I l(a)(3)
Civil Non-business related violation of WBCA Up to 500
Civil Violation of African Elephant Conservation Act Up to 5000
Civil Violation of Bald Eagle Protection Act Up to 5000
Disclosure of public information about unlawful
EEOC Civil employment practice under Title 7 during Up to 1000
proceeding
Civil Discriminatory practice with malice Punitive damages
civil Total damages under Title 7 for small business Up to 50,000(under 100 employees)
civil Total damages under Title 7 for medium business Up to 100,000(over 100 less than 200 employees)
civil Total damages under Title 7 for large business Up to 200,000(over 200, less than 500 employees) Upto_200,000
Total damages under Title 7 for big business (moreCivil ta50emles)Up to 300,000
1than 500 employees)Civil Willful violation of§ 15 of Equal Pay Act Up to 10,000
Criminal Above Up to 6 mos.prison
Notice that within categories, penalties seem extremely sensible, at least in
the sense that the more serious harms are punished more severely. For
occupational safety and health violations, the largest penalties are for repeated
violations, the next largest for violations that are both willful and serious, and
the least serious for failures to engage in the requisite record-keeping. The
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Wild Bird Conservation Act imposes its most serious penalties for unlawful
imports of wild birds or members of endangered species; penalties are less
severe if violations are not undertaken as part of import-export business, or if
they are not knowing and willful. The most serious acts of discrimination are
subject to more serious penalties. In general, each of the regulatory
arrangements shows a high degree of internal consistency.
At the same time, it seems clear that this system contains serious
anomalies. The penalties do not fit together as a coherent whole, and it is most
unlikely that most people would approve of all that appears here. The most
obvious set of anomalies involves OSHA. A serious violation of OSHA calls
for a maximum penalty of $7000; unlawful importation of a wild bird calls for
a penalty of more than triple that amount ($25,000). In fact, the penalties
imposed by the Fish and Wildlife Service are systematically higher than those
imposed by OSHA. It is extremely doubtful that the public would support that
pattern of penalties, taken as a whole.
Of course it is possible that agency enforcement patterns create sense out
of nonsense. Perhaps those statutes with low maximum fines are frequently
enforced, and perhaps enforcement activity in such cases involves maximum
fines-whereas statutes with anomalously high maximum fines might be
enforced less frequently, and agencies might seek fines toward the low end.
We would be surprised if this were true. But for present purposes, the key
point is that no one seems even to have asked whether the resulting pattern of
fines, on the books or in the world, makes any sense at all.
C. Difficult Cross-Category Comparisons
It is relatively easy to compare OSHA violations with OSHA violations; it
is much harder to compare OSHA violations with Endangered Species Act
violations or with acts of unlawful discrimination. To be sure, categories
themselves can probably be compared. Offhand, most people are likely to
think that it is worse to subject someone to life-threatening working conditions
than to discriminate against them. It is reasonable to suppose that the category
of occupational safety and health violations ranks higher than the category of
unlawful discrimination. Hence it is odd that an act of discrimination can
receive a penalty of $50,000 and more, whereas an OSHA violation is subject
to a $7000 ceiling. But many cross-category comparisons are much harder to
make. An egregious act of discrimination (say, firing a long-time employee on
the basis of racist motivations and attempting to ruin that employee's career) is
difficult to compare with a milder case of an occupational safety violation (say,
failing to ensure that ladders and toilets comply with OSHA regulations).
Illustrations could easily be multiplied. A general conclusion would
follow from them: A consensus is hard to achieve on the content of full
coherence (return to the epigraph from Justice Breyer); but it would be much
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easier to achieve general agreement that certain outcomes are truly anomalous.
This point is directly relevant to the question of institutional reform.
D. A Civil Penalties Commission?
The data alone cannot show how and to what extent it would be
appropriate to revise the set of administrative penalties, once they are taken as a
whole. The initial problem is that, to our knowledge, the pattern of penalties
has not until now even been presented as such, at least within the legal
literature. The oddity to which we draw attention is the remarkable tolerance
of the system for a set of outcomes that do not fit together and that show
significant anomalies. Legislators and administrators appear to have made
judgments within categories without investigating whether the resulting
judgments can be criticized as palpably incoherent. Whatever the difficulties in
producing a rational pattern-and they are formidable-at least it seems clear
that some effort should be made to correct the worst outliers. Because courts
must take statutes and regulations as they stand, there is little that judges can do
about the problem. Instead, reforms must come from executive and legislative
spheres.
In these circumstances, we suggest three possible routes to reform. First,
the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA), within the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB), should provide a full accounting of
regulatory penalties, publicize it, and evaluate the existing pattern of outcomes,
with recommendations both to agencies and to Congress. The longstanding
mission of OMB in general and OIRA in particular has been to produce more
in the way of global rationality, with respect to regulation and the budget
generally. This role should be extended to better rationalization of the system
of administrative penalties. Note in this regard that even without legislative
change, agencies have considerable room to maneuver. Seeing that
occupational safety violations are low, they might choose penalties at the high
end of the permissible range. Seeing that penalties for violations of the Wild
Bird Conservation Act are relatively high, the Fish and Wildlife Service might
select penalties at the low end of the permissible range. The purpose of
executive oversight would be to move agency practice in the direction of a
sensible overall pattern of penalties. Of course, we have suggested that
coherence is difficult to achieve,. in part because people do not agree on what it
requires, and in part because they do not find it easy to rank cases from diverse
categories. But at the very least, some kind of coherence commission could
correct palpable errors; and perhaps it could try to be more ambitious. If it
proves infeasible for OMB to undertake the task, perhaps an advisory
committee could be appointed within the executive branch to explore the
problem and possible correctives.
The second route for reform involves Congress. On both the House and
Senate sides, we suggest that new subcommittees, growing out of existing
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committees on regulation and administrative practice, should be created on
administrative penalties. The purpose of the subcommittees should be to gather
information about administrative penalties, as described in statutes and
regulations, and also about actual agency practices-with the goal of
publicizing the results and ultimately enacting corrective legislation, at least in
response to the most obvious anomalies. Nothing said here establishes the
appropriate content of that legislation. But we believe that we have established
that if the overall pattern is not presented before citizens and representatives,
incoherence and injustice are inevitable results.
A third route would involve a mixture of legislative and administrative
action. Acting on the model of the Sentencing Commission, Congress should
create a Civil Penalties Commission, whose responsibility would be to give a
public accounting of civil penalties system-wide and to propose or perhaps
implement standards for rationalizing them. The simplest task of the Civil
Penalties Commission would be to correct the most obvious errors; as we have
seen, it would be much harder to produce agreement on what would make the
full set of outcomes coherent. More generally, the Civil Penalties Commission
should give a sense of the relationship between the law on the books (including
statutory maxima and minima) and actual practice (for example, the frequency,
median, average, and range of penalties). Like the Sentencing Commission, it
should be composed of diverse people; it might well include judges. The Civil
Penalties Commission might be purely advisory, or it might have the authority
to issue guidelines to discipline administrative agencies, so as to increase the
likelihood of coherence. In the interest of public disclosure, the Civil Penalties
Commission should maintain a website containing information about current
practice, allowing comparisons, and discussing proposals. Of course, the
actions of the Civil Penalties Commission would be subject to congressional
review.
We conclude this section by commenting on similarities and differences
between this discussion of administrative penalties and the earlier discussion of
punitive damages and contingent valuation. The critical difference is that
penalties are now set by category, not by case. The main source of incoherence
is not normalization, but the arbitrariness inherent in the use of dollar values (or
indeed of other numerical scales like time in jail) to express the intensity of the
response to harms and to the people who perpetrate them. What is common to
findings in both types of problems is that people's thinking does not
spontaneously cross boundaries between categories; when setting penalties for
violations of the fish and wildlife statutes, people do not naturally ask about
penalties for violations of the tax and pollution laws. Indeed, in the current
arrangement, an administrator charged with attention to one category of
problems who actively considers problems from other categories might be
accused of wasting resources, of poaching on the turf of other officials, and
conceivably even of illegality. In addition, a full understanding of
administrative penalties would require an exploration of political dynamics
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and, in particular, the role of interest groups in assigning dollar values to
regulatory violations. Interest group power is undoubtedly magnified by the
difficulty of knowing what different amounts mean in the context of the system
as a whole. As we have suggested, interest group power would be greatly
reduced if comparisons were routine-if the penalties established under one
statute were routinely evaluated against a number of penalties from other
categories. We think that such comparisons would be highly likely to increase
the sense and rationality of a system that currently falls short on both counts.
VII. PREDICTABLE INCOHERENCE: EXTENSIONS, SPECULATIONS, AND
REMEDIES
If one-shot judgments are predictably incoherent in the contexts discussed
thus far, it is likely that the legal system is beset by similar problems elsewhere.
We now broaden the viewscreen, not to resolve the issues with which we will
deal, but to show that related difficulties can be found in other domains. The
overarching point is that incoherence is likely to be created and to persist
wherever cases are considered one at a time, because of the translation
problem, category-bound thinking, or both. Our goal here, as elsewhere, is not
to suggest that agreement on full coherence is easy or even possible to achieve,
but instead to emphasize the possibility of correcting the worst abuses once the
viewscreen is widened and comparisons are made.
A. Criminal Penalties: A Cognitive Perspective on Guidelines
To say the least, the topic of sentencing guidelines has received massive
attention. 0 2 Our findings cast new light on the value of such guidelines-not
only to overcome differences among judges (an original inspiration for the
guidelines'03), but also to reduce the predictable problems created when people
select penalties one case or category at a time (a difficulty that the guidelines
do not attempt to solve).' °4 If we are right, judicial sentencing without
guidelines is likely to produce incoherence, simply because people do not
naturally seek to put individual decisions into a sensible overall pattern. The
same problems will arise for legislatures imposing criminal punishments by
categories. And if those who create sentencing guidelines are not alert to the
problems, they will not solve them.
102. See, e.g., Albert Alschuler, The Failure of Sentencing Guidelines: A Plea for Less
Aggregation, 58 U. CHI. L .REv. 901 (1991).
103. See id.
104. The reason is that the Sentencing Commission built on past practice, without
attempting to engage in any more ambitious effort at rationalization. See Breyer, supra note
96.
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To be sure, it is not impossible that judicial experience with a wide range
of cases could reduce the problem of incoherent sentences. It is conceivable
that by virtue of their experience, judges engaged in sentencing have a kind of
"sentencing menu" in their heads, reducing the difficulties we have found here.
On the other hand, our evidence suggests that the difficulties will persist unless
they are explicitly drawn to people's attention. Whether and how judges can
overcome the relevant problems remains an empirical question, one that we
discuss in more detail below. But even the most experienced judge must
engage in isolated sentencing decisions, and it is highly likely that without
guidelines, within-category coherence and global incoherence will be the
result. To the extent that sentencing guidelines can reduce this problem, they
should provide large improvements.
But we do not mean only to provide support for the idea of federal
sentencing guidelines. Our discussion suggests that there is good reason for
much more in the way of rationalization at the state and federal levels. Within
the states, there continue to be many anomalies. In Illinois, for example,
reckless conduct-defined as the performance of reckless acts that cause bodily
harm or endanger the bodily safety of an individual by any means-is a
misdemeanor punishable by up to one year of imprisonment.105 Oddly, the
sentence is the same if the harm is intentional, i.e., the offense is a battery. 106
Still more oddly, the same penalty is provided for those who, for example,
write on the side of a cave or disturb a bat inside a cave without the consent of
the owner. 0 7 Indeed, a person who captures an eagle for commercial purposes,
or offers any part of an eagle for sale, is guilty of a Class 3 felony, punishable
by two to five years in prison.' As far as we are aware, no state has made a
substantial effort to rationalize its system of criminal punishment. In fact, we
are aware of no work, academic or otherwise, that attempts to explore whether
state penalties fit into a sensible whole.
At the same time, the federal sentencing guidelines do not avoid the
problem of global incoherence. As we have noted, the Sentencing Commission
built on existing judicial practice, and it did not attempt to overcome the
problems discussed here. 09 Justice Breyer's suggestion, quoted above, is that
the Commission's relative lack of ambition was a product of the sheer
difficulty of the task of achieving agreement on rankings across categories.
Most of the ongoing work of the Sentencing Commission has involved the
achievement of within-category coherence, a much easier task. The existence
of extremely high penalties for drug offenses, alongside lower penalties for
105. 720 ILL. CoMP. STAT. 5/12-5 (2001).
106. Id. 5/12-3.
107. 520 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/7 (2001).
108. Id. 5/2.36.
109. See Breyer, supra note 96.
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crimes of violence, attests to the problem. But the problem goes deeper still,
involving not only incoherence, but also complexities in defining categories.
The most highly publicized anomalies involve the treatment of powder and
crack cocaine." 0 Under federal law, it takes 100 times as much powder cocaine
as crack cocaine to trigger equivalent mandatory penalties, so that the
mandatory five-year penalty applies to someone with 500 grams of powder
cocaine and five grams of crack cocaine."' Perhaps powder cocaine and crack
cocaine should be seen as different categories of drugs altogether, rather than
just subcategories of "cocaine," because of the fact that crack cocaine is more
often associated with systemic crime." 2 For current purposes, what is most
important is that the comparison of the two has produced the widespread view
that penalties for crack cocaine are far too severe."' This view is itself
evidence for our basic claim here: It is easy to suggest that powder cocaine and
crack cocaine belong to the same category, and hence easy to generate a public
outcry against the within-category inconsistency. In the abstract, it might be
hard to know whether one or another mandatory minimum is best, perhaps
because of the difficulty of finding a "modulus" with which to scale. The
comparative exercise produces public concern.
This is simply one example. The Sentencing Commission, and Congress
itself, should engage far more in the way of cross-category comparisons
designed to reduce the largest anomalies, including both excessive severity and
unwarranted leniency.
B. Contingent Valuation
Contingent valuation is being used in many nations, including the United
States, to assign monetary amounts to environmental and other goods.
Nonetheless, contingent valuation raises many complex questions, and it is not
clear that the practice can be defended."4
Recall that contingent valuation is a procedure in which people are asked
to describe their attitude toward different harms, as well as toward public
actions designed to correct or mitigate harms, on a scale of hypothetical
willingness to pay. As we have suggested, the psychological difficulties
associated with the task of a respondent in a contingent valuation survey are
precisely analogous to the difficulties faced by a juror in determining punitive
damages. The translation problem-the absence of a principled or intuitively
compelling way to use the dollar scale-arises in two different ways. First, the
110. See UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, COCAINE AND FEDERAL
SENTENCING POLICY (1995).
111. Id. at iii.
112. Id. at 4.
113. See id. at 2-3.
114. See Diamond & Hausman, supra note 21, at 51-52 (1994).
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numbers that people provide for any specific problem can be arbitrary and
therefore not a sensible guide for policy. Second, the normalization process
tends to distort the valuations of items from different categories. We have seen
that ecological problems gain a great deal from being presented in isolation,
and that health problems lose from that style of presentation. At the very least,
people answering contingent valuation questions should not be restricted to a
small set of problems from one or more categories.
The most modest reform would attempt to ensure that any responses to
contingent valuation questions are given after exposure to sufficient
information to counteract the difficulties discussed here. Some people have
attempted to design contingent valuation studies that offer a wide range of
categories, so as to diminish the risk of incoherence. Respondents could be
asked about problems from a number of cases at once, so as to ensure that any
particular answer follows from cross-category comparisons. There are,
however, problems with this approach, akin to those discussed in the context of
punitive damages: information overload, framing, and manipulation. 15 People
can process a small set of cases, but any such set risks framing effects; a fall
range of cases, sufficient to overcome those effects, might overload people's
cognitive capacities. It is not clear that this modest reform could ultimately
succeed.
A much less modest reform, based on the approach in Texas, would be to
move away from contingent valuation and toward a damage schedule for
environmental harms, based on a combination of technocratic and democratic
judgments." 6 Such a schedule would be produced by people considering the
full range of cases. The most serious risk of such a reform is that coherence
would be purchased at the price of increasing interest group power over the
determination of penalties. The extent of this risk cannot be assessed in the
abstract.
Because the evaluation of these reforms raises many of the same questions
as in the context of punitive damages, and because there is an emerging
literature on the point,"17 we will not discuss them in any detail here. What we
have added is a fresh reason for skepticism about many contingent valuation
studies: They do not require people to engage in cross-category comparisons,
and hence they generate outcomes that people would not themselves endorse,
taken as a whole.
115. For example, there are large anchoring effects when several environmental goods
are evaluated in sequence-when a highly valued good comes first, the willingness to pay
for the goods that follow is higher than when a lower-valued good comes first. See John
Payne, David Schkade, Willliam Desvousges & Chris Aultman, Valuation of Multiple
Environmental Programs, 21 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 95 (2000).
116. See Kahneman & Ritov, supra note 38, at 30.
117. See Murray Rutherford et al., Assessing Environmental Losses: Judgments of
Importance and Damage Schedules, 22 HARV. ENvTL. L. REV. 51 (1998); RicHARD B.
STE\VART & RICHARD REVEsz, ANALYZING SUPERFUND (1995).
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C. Regulatory Crazy-Quilts
Related issues arise in the continuing debates about expenditures on life-
saving regulatory measures. The central point here is that agencies generally
decide on the appropriate extent of regulation without being required to engage
in cross-category comparison (and indeed, with little in the way of constraints
from Congress"I). Agencies generally act in isolation, and without specifying
the regulatory expenditure per life saved, this institutional fact has increased
the difficulty of ensuring global coherence. For many years, agency actions
were categorized by subject matter, and no one attempted to ensure cross-
category comparisons, let alone to see if the relevant actions could be seen as
falling, in some sense, within the same category.
In 1986, an official at the Office of Management and Budget had an
extremely clever, psychologically acute idea, and a simple table was compiled,
allowing comparisons of agency practice. 19 That table has come to dominate
many discussions of these problems. 21 The table seemed to have such an
effect in part because it made the underlying numbers explicit, and in part
because it made comparisons possible across programs. Indeed, the dramatic
effect of the table seemed to stem from the fact that it put a wide range of
seemingly separate problems under a single "category": government efforts to
save lives through regulatory protection. Once the table was constructed,
unnoticed anomalies became highly visible.
It should be no surprise that critics of the table have urged that separate
categories are involved here, and that people should not be so quick to think
that the current situation is senseless.12' This response makes perfect
psychological sense. Creative observers can undoubtedly suggest that the
apparent anomalies dissolve on inspection. Our only claim here is that an
effort to put regulatory requirements into a more general system has raised
eyebrows.
A prominent study of 500 life-saving interventions goes much further.'2
The study shows systematic disparities in expenditures across agencies, with
some problems receiving apparently disproportionate attention. Consider, for
example, the fact that the median cost per life year is $23,000 for the Federal
Aviation Administration; $68,000 for the Consumer Product Safety
Commission; $78,000 for the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration;
118. See Cass R. Sunstein, Risk and Reason (forthcoming 2002)
119. See John Morrall, A Review of the Record, REG., Nov.-Dec. 1986, at 25, 30 tbl.4.
120. A skeptical overview is found in Lisa Heinzerling, Regulatory Costs of Mythic
Proportions, 107 YALE L. J. 1981 (1998). See Appendix E, infra, for a recent version of this
table.
121. See id. at 2041-42..
122. See Tammy 0. Tengs, Miriam E. Adams, Joseph S. Pliskin, Dana Gelb Safran,
Joanna E. Siegel, Milton C. Weinstein & John D. Graham, Five Hundred Life-Saving
Expenditures and Their Cost-Effectiveness, 15 RISK ANALYsIS 369 (1995).
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$88,000 for the Occupational Safety and Health Administration; and several
million dollars for the Environmental Protection Agency.123 Here too, cross-
category comparisons has played a large role in reform debates,2 4 suggesting
that American government could save the same number of lives it now saves
with $31 billion in savings-or that we could use the same level of resources
we now use, and end up saving 60,000 more lives every year.
To be sure, this is not a "pure" case of the kind that we have been
emphasizing throughout: Many of the relevant government actions were
apparently undertaken without explicit decisions about the relevant numbers, or
about how much should be spent in different areas. Hence the evidence shows
apparently inexplicable disparities within agencies. We believe that an
investigation of those anomalies and an attempt to correct them would be likely
to alter government behavior, and perhaps to save money and lives in the
process.
VIII. COGNITIVE NOTES ON LEGAL THEORY
Our findings and claims here bear on two intensely debated issues in legal
theory. The first involves the aspiration to fully coherent law. The second
involves the idea of "incommensurability." We will not engage the normative
issues, but we will suggest that an understanding of cognitive issues illuminates
both debates.
123. Id.at371.
124. The role of cross-category comparisons is sharply contested in this domain. In a
prominent article Lisa Heinzerling, for example, has deplored "quantification," suggesting
that the table printed above gives an illusion of precision. See Heinzerling, supra note 120,
at 1986, 2069. In her view, this is an illusion because many of the numbers depend on
contestable value judgments, involving, for example, the appropriate discount rate; and
because quantitatively identical risks should be treated differently if, for example, they
involve involuntary exposure and uncontrollable harm.
Even if Heinzerling makes some legitimate criticisms here-and we believe that she
does-we think that her skepticism about quantification neglects some important points
about human cognition, of central relevance to regulatory policy. First, people will often
have a hard time in assessing the appropriate degree of regulation without some assistance
from seeing the pattern of expenditures used in other cases. With respect to regulatory
expenditures, legislators, regulators, and others are too often in the position of those
attempting to impose punitive damage awards in an empirical vacuum. Second, and of
special relevance to our claims here, an attempt to see the overall pattern of expenditures in
monetary terms can greatly aid the process of producing coherent regulation, simply by
bringing into view the existence of other categories and a sense of how problems within
those categories are treated. Cross-category comparisons, even fairly crude ones, can help
people to generate more sensible patterns even if the "bottom line" numbers are not treated
as determinative, and even if it makes sense to say that some problems deserve more
attention than others, even if they are quantitatively identical. In short, we think tables of
this sort can help to produce more rational regulation even for those who insist that it would
make no sense to insist on a mechanical number for every regulatory program.
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A. Coherence in Law
The last years have seen an intense debate about the aspiration to global
coherence in law.' 21 Much of the debate has involved the appropriate
conception of legal reasoning, an issue with both normative and descriptive
dimensions. Ronald Dworkin has been the most prominent advocate of
ambitious thinking, in which judges do not always restrict themselves to small
pockets of problems, but sometimes attempt to ensure that all parts of law fit
together as a principled whole.126 Others (including one of the current authors)
have argued against this idea on the ground that it would strain judicial
capacities and perhaps tend to produce errors of its own.127
In a discussion of particular relevance to our topic here, Dworkin discusses
the "compartmentalization of law into separate departments" and sees that as a
"prominent feature of legal practice."'12 Hercules, Dworkin's idealized judge,
makes judgments that "expand out from the immediate case before him in a
series of concentric circles," increasingly far afield from the particular case and
category at hand. 29 Hercules does not take the law's compartments for
granted, and he is willing to reject any idea of "local priority" where
"traditional boundaries between departments have become mechanical and
arbitrary."'130 It seems clear that Hercules is willing to attempt global
coherence, as, for example, through "a new unification of private law that blurs
even the long-established and once much firmer boundary between contract
and tort."'' Advocates of less ambitious thinking stress that judges are not in a
good position to make global sense of multiple areas of the law, and that the
effort to try, especially if it is early, might well overwhelm the cognitive
capacities of judges. 32
Our findings do not resolve these issues, which have arisen in a much
broader context than those discussed here. We have assessed judgments within
and across categories, but in the relatively simple setting of judgments about
penalties rendered in terms of dollars or years. We have not explored how the
process of category-bound judgments would affect free speech principles in
125. See DWORKiN, supra note 15; CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LEGAL REASONING AND
POLITICAL CONFLICT (1996); CAss R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME (1999); Edward J.
McCaffery, Ronald Dworkin, Inside-Out, 85 CAL. L. REV. 1043 (1997) (reviewing RONALD
DwoRImN, FREEDOM's LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN CONsTrrTION (1996)).
126. See Ronald Dworkin, In Praise of Theory, 29 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 353 (1997).
127. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 125.
128. DWORKIN, supra note 15, at 251.
129. Id. at 250.
130. Id. at 253.
131. Id. at 254.
132. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 125; see also McCaffery, supra note 125 (arguing that
cognitive limitations might justify a less ambitious approach from courts, and that this less
ambitious approach is consistent with Dworkin's general understanding of legal
interpretation as integrity).
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categories involving pornography, commercial speech, and libel, or tort and
contract principles involving medical malpractice, building construction, and
prescription drug sales. The translation problem is not present in most
doctrinal controversies, at least not in the same form. To see whether our
arguments generalize, it would be important to know whether, for example,
people's judgments about the appropriate treatment of false commercial speech
and libelous speech would be different in isolation from what they would be if
the two categories were considered together. We do not have evidence on that
issue. Nonetheless, we think that what we have found casts some fresh light on
this debate, giving a more detailed account of why it is hard to produce global
coherence, but also providing at least indirect support for Dworkin's view, on
the ground that local pockets of coherence might well produce an overall
pattern that is senseless, or that at least contains what everyone would see as
senselessness.
To be sure, global coherence would be a significant strain on judicial
capacities, in part because the mental operations involved do not come
naturally. Judicial efforts to provide more limited forms of "local coherence,"
through relatively unambitious reasoning by analogy, can be understood as a
good way of avoiding cognitive overload-by focusing on the cognitively
manageable category, and by failing to investigate problems from other
categories. But our larger point cuts the other way, giving strong cognitive
ammunition to Dworkin's plea for global coherence. We have provided reason
to believe that in law, the various categories showing internal coherence will
not fit together and that the pattern of outcomes, generated by unambitious
judges, will contain what they themselves would see as error and confusion.
Referring precisely to this risk, Dworkin suggests that we "must strive, so far
as we can, not to apply one theory of liability to pharmaceutical companies and
a different one to motorists, not to embrace one theory of free speech when we
are worried about pornography and another when we are worried about flag
burning."' 33 If law is to be coherent, Dworkin is entirely correct. Judges who
seek only local coherence, or who proceed one case at a time, are highly likely
to produce a pattern of outcomes of which they themselves would disapprove.
B. Commensurability and Incommensurability
Are values or options commensurableT 34 In what sense? Those who
object to the idea of commensurability claim that people lack a shared metric
by which to assess an array of qualitatively distinctive options. They believe
that the use of such a metric can do violence to our considered judgments about
133. Dworkin, supra note 126, at 376.
134. See ELIZABETH ANDERSON, VALUE IN ETHICS AND EcoNoMics (1993); JOSEPH
RAz, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 321-66 (1985).
1201
HeinOnline  -- 54 Stan. L. Rev. 1201 2001-2002
STANFORD LA WREVIEW
how such options should be assessed.' 35 On this view, ideas like "utility" and
"efficiency" are quite inadequate as a way of capturing the operation of
practical reason in law or daily life; these ideas are inadequate because they
elide qualitative differences that matter when people reason well. 36
We do not attempt to take a stand on any normative issues here, nor do we
attempt to give anything like an account of the operation of practical reason.
But we do suggest that our findings here help to establish a cognitive basis for
part of the experience of "incommensurability" in both law and ordinary
thinking. People lack confident judgments about how to rank cases from
different categories, and their judgments on this point are not widely shared.
Recall the difficulty of comparing a case of tax fraud with an occupational
safety and health violation, or of ranking a case of outrageous commercial
fraud against one involving a relatively minor physical injury. For those using
ordinary intuitions, there is no readily available metric by which to make the
relevant comparisons. 37 It is in this particular respect that incommensurability
is a concrete psychological phenomenon. 38
IX. CONCLUSION
We have attempted here to identify some pervasive features of human
judgment and cognition-features that, we believe, account for significant
anomalies in both private and public law. In making many judgments in law,
people must translate a moral judgment into numerical terms, involving dollars
or years. Moreover, people's judgments are insistently category-bound. They
do not naturally seek coherence across categories. Their assessments of
problems, taken in isolation, are often different from their judgments about
problems, taken in the context of cases from other categories. This is largely
because any judgment, in isolation, is made against a background of a "natural"
comparison set, consisting of problems from the same basic category. Much of
the time, people will look at problems from other categories only when forced
to do so. When a problem from a different category is introduced, the isolated
judgment is unsettled, and people's judgments will shift, sometimes quite
dramatically. The reason is that the introduction of the new problem alters the
set of comparison cases, and shifts in judgment are a common consequence of
that alteration.
The most important implication of this phenomenon is that judgments in
isolation will predictably produce incoherence from the standpoint of the very
135. See ANDERSON, supra note 134, at 55-59.
136. See id. at 203-15.
137. Here, economics can overcome the incommensurability problem by using the
metric of dollars.
138. Also see the discussion of "taboo tradeoffs" in Philip E. Tetlock, Coping With
Trade-Offs: Psychological Constraints and Political Implications, in ELEMENTS OF REASON
239 (Arthur Lopia et al. eds., 2000).
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people asked to make those judgments. This is true of judgments about
punitive damage awards; it is also true of willingness to pay for public goods.
Thus, judgment shifts are easy to generate in experimental settings. Outside of
those settings, we have seen similar results in the domains of regulatory
penalties. The pattern of within-category coherence, and global incoherence, is
a nearly inevitable product of adjudication that is defined by one-shot
judgments; the same pattern is embedded in many domains of law and policy.
These are descriptive points. It is far less clear what to do about the
situation. Introduction of a single problem from one separate category might
make things worse rather than better. There is a serious risk of manipulation
and strategic behavior here; careful selection of the comparison case can drive
judgment in predictable directions. Deaths of buffaloes might seem a relatively
small problem when presented alongside deaths of human beings; but deaths of
buffaloes might seem a relatively large problem when presented alongside
injuries to plants. In these circumstances, the ideal solution for a legal system
committed to obtaining people's reflective judgments is to move in the
direction of ensuring, not attention to one category or two, but simultaneous
appreciation of the large number of categories of cases to which any particular
case might be compared.
Coherence is important; it seems to be a minimum requirement of
rationality. But coherence is not a trumping value, and a system displaying
incoherence may well be better than one that is coherent but pervasively unjust.
There is little to be said for a coherent system in which penalties fit together,
but are three times as high, or one-third as high, as they ought to be.
Nonetheless, we think that any domain of law should aspire to coherence, at
least as a presumption, in order to prevent the kinds of arbitrariness and
injustice that we have found in both experimental and real-world settings. At
the very least, efforts should be made to correct the most conspicuous
anomalies-a goal that can be obtained without thinking that it is easy or even
possible for people to agree on what full coherence actually requires.
We have emphasized throughout that for any single person, or jury, the
achievement of coherence is an exceptionally difficult cognitive task. But steps
in the direction of coherence are far less difficult at the level of institutional
design.'39 We close with the suggestion that the practical remedies for
predictably incoherent judgments are institutional; they involve the creation of
frameworks for decision that ensure a pattern of judgments that, when taken as
a whole, reflective people could endorse. Perhaps this seems an unrealistically
ambitious aspiration. But something of just this sort underlies many of the
most impressive institutional innovations of the twentieth century. It should
not be too much to expect twenty-first century institutions to build on these
139. This is a lesson of the movement to workers' compensation, as described in
FISHBACK & KANTOR, supra note 14.
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APPENDIX A. EXCERPTS FROM INSTRUCTIONS
Background on Civil Legal Cases and Your Role
In this part of the study, we would like you to imagine that you are a juror
for a legal case in a civil court. Civil law suits involve disputes between
private individuals, companies, or individuals and companies, in which the
plaintiff alleges that the defendant harmed them in some way. The primary
purpose of a civil suit brought by a plaintiff is to seek compensation from the
defendant for the alleged harm.
Civil suits involve two different types of potential damages that a
defendant could be could be required to pay. Compensatory damages are
intended to fully compensate a plaintiff for the harm suffered as a result of the
defendant's actions. Punitive damages are intended to achieve two purposes:
(1) to punish the defendant for unusual misconduct, and (2) to deter the
defendant and others from committing similar actions in the future.
Punitive damages should be awarded if a preponderance of the evidence
shows that the defendant acted either maliciously or with reckless disregard for
the welfare of others. Defendants are considered to have acted maliciously if
they intended to injure or harm someone or their property. Defendants are
considered to have acted with reckless disregard for the welfare of others if
they were aware of the probable harm to others or their property but
disregarded it, and their actions were a gross deviation from the standard of
care that a normal person would use.
The case you will consider involves a special procedure that is sometimes
used in civil trials, and which requires two different juries: (1) a trial jury,
which decides whether the defendant should pay compensatory damages to the
plaintiff, and if so in what amount, and (2) if compensatory damages are
awarded, a separate punishment jury decides whether the defendant's conduct
also warrants punitive damages.
Please imagine that you are a member of the punishment jury for this case.
Your job is to decide whether and how much the defendant should be punished,
in addition to paying compensatory damages.
In the case you will consider, the trial jury has already ordered the
defendant to pay compensatory damages to the plaintiff. This does not
necessarily mean that punitive damages must also be awarded. Whether or not
punitive damages should be awarded and, if so, how large they should be is
completely separate from compensatory damages.
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APPENDIX B. EXAMPLE PAIR OF LEGAL CASES140
1. Marking v. Royal Motors (Financial Harm)
Among his other large investments, William Marking owns Canyon
Luxury Leasing, a company that leases luxury cars. He bought 1000 cars from
Royal Motors, a manufacturer of high-priced automobiles with annual profits
of around $150 million. Royal Motors did not disclose the fact that the paint
on all 1000 cars was not the original factory paint: all cars had been repainted
from an ugly shade of green to the current colors of red and black.
One month after the purchase, an employee of Royal Motors reported this
fact to a local newspaper, and the repaintings received a great deal of national
publicity. Mr. Marking believes that people who lease luxury cars demand
perfection, and that this negative publicity caused a sharp decrease in business.
He has sued Royal Motors for compensation.
Internal documents of Royal Motors produced at the trial included a
management memo: "Marking will not be happy at all when he finds out that
the cars have been repainted. He will feel that we took advantage of him, but it
was his responsibility to check the cars. Anyway we run almost no risk: it will
not be in Marking's interest to publicize the problem, so he will not dare sue
us, no matter how mad he is. The worst that will happen is that he won't buy
from us again." The trial jury ordered Royal Motors to pay $500,000 in
compensatory damages.
2. Glover v. General Assistance (Physical Harm)
Joan Glover, a five-year-old child, ingested a large number of pills of a
non-prescription allergy medicine called Allerfree. The Allerfree bottle carried
a label reading "Childproof Cap," but it did not meet federal regulations for the
use of that label.
Joan's parents testified that they had been very careful in ensuring that all
of their medications had childproof safety caps. Joan found the pills in a
kitchen drawer and ingested most of the bottle. The overdose permanently
weakened her respiratory system, which will make her more susceptible to
breathing-related diseases such as asthma and emphysema for the rest of her
life, and may reduce her life expectancy.
Joan's parents sued the manufacturer of Allerfree, the General Assistance
company, a drug manufacturer with annual profits of $150 million. Internal
company documents showed that General Assistance chose to ignore federal
140. Pair A from Table 1.
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regulations about standards for using the label, "Childproof Cap." An internal
memo presented at trial says that "this stupid, unnecessary federal regulation is
a waste of our money"; it acknowledges the risk that Allerfree might be
punished for violating the regulation but says "the punishments are extremely
mild; basically we'd be asked to improve the safety caps in the future." The
trial jury ordered General Assistance to pay the Glovers $500,000 in
compensatory damages.
3. Response Scales: Isolation
What amount of punitive damages (if any) should Royal Motors be
required to pay as punishment and to deter them and others from similar
actions in the future? Compensatory damages do not count as part of the
punishment. Please write the appropriate amount of punitive damages in the
blank below.
OR
How severely should Royal Motors be punished because of their actions,
and to deter them and others from similar actions in the future? Note that the
compensatory damages that they must pay do not count as part of the
punishment. Please circle the number that best expresses your judgment of the
appropriate level ofpunishment.
Extremely
None Mild Substantial Severe Severe
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
4. Response Scales: Comparison
We would like you to compare this case (Glover v. General Assistance) to
the legal case you saw earlier (Marking v. Royal Motors, which involved
repainted cars).
Compared to Royal Motors, how much punishment does General
Assistance deserve? (please circle your answer)
Less than The same as More than
Royal Motors Royal Motors Royal Motors
What amount of punitive damages (if any) should General Assistance be
required to pay as punishment and to deter them and others from similar
actions in the future? Compensatory damages do not count as part of the
punishment. Please write the appropriate amount of punitive damages in the
blank below.
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OR
How severely should General Assistance be punished because of their
actions, and to deter them and others from similar actions in the future? Note
that the compensatory damages that they must pay do not count as part of the
punishment. Please circle the number that best expresses your judgment of the
appropriate level ofpunishment.
None Mild Substantial Severe
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
Extremely
Severe
7 8
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APPENDIX C. EXAMPLE PAIR OF PUBLIC CAUSES141
1. Environmental Harm
The next question moves outside the legal context. It involves problems of
a more general nature, which concern society as a whole. In this part we are
interested in your reaction as a member of society, rather than as a potential
juror.
Dolphins in many breeding locations are threatened by pollution. The
threat to breeding locations is expected to result in a decline of the dolphin
population. A special fund is needed to clean up and protect dolphin breeding
locations.
Increased funding to provide pollution free breeding locations for dolphins
must be supported mostly by private contributions. Consider the possibility of
making a voluntary contribution of money to this fund.
2. Harm to Humans
The next question moves outside the legal context. It involves problems of
a more general nature, which concern society as a whole. In this part we are
interested in your reaction as a member of society, rather than as a potential
juror.
Farm workers, who are exposed to the sun for many hours, have a higher
rate of skin cancer than the general population. Frequent medical checkups can
reduce the risk. Increased funds are needed to establish programs for more
frequent checkups of the threatened groups.
Increased funding for these programs must be supported mostly by private
contributions. Consider the possibility of making a voluntary contribution of
money to this fund.
3. Response Scales: Isolation
What amount of money (if any) would you be willing to contribute to the
fund to protect dolphins? Please write your amount in the blank below.
OR
141. Pair D from Table 1.
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How much personal satisfaction would you expect to get from making a
contribution a fund to protect dolphins? (please circle your answer)
No
satisfaction
at all
0
Less than for A moderate
A little most
contributions amount
A
significant
amount
A great' Extreme
deal satisfaction
4 5 6
4. Response Scales: Comparison
We would like you to compare this problem (farm workers' skin cancer),
to the problem of public concern that you saw earlier (protection of dolphins).
Compared to protecting dolphins, how much money would you be willing
to contribute to a fund for farm workers' skin cancer? (circle your choice)
Less than for
dolphins
The same as for
dolphins
More than for
dolphins
What amount of money (if any) would you be willing to contribute to a
fund to reduce farm workers' skin cancer? Please write your amount in the
blank below.
OR
How much personal satisfaction would you expect to get from making a
contribution to a fund to reducefarm workers' skin cancer? (please circle your
answer)
No satisfaction A Less than forat all little most
contributions
A moderate A
amount significant
amount
4 5 6
A
great
deal
Extreme
satisfaction
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APPENDIX D. SELECTED CIVIL PENALTIES FROM ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES
Agency Criminal Type of violation Penalty
OSHA Civil Violation of a serious nature Up to $7000
Civil Violation of non-serious nature Up to $7000
Civil Violation of posting requirement Up to $7000
Willful violation if non-serious or No less than
Civil regulatory $5000
Civil Willful violation if serious No less than
_________$25,000
Civil Repeated violations Up to $70,000
Civil Violation of record keeping- reporting Up to $7000
Civil Failure to make requested forms available Up to $3000
FDA Civil Violation of Egg Products Inspection Act Up to $1000
civil Above and intent to defraud or distribute Up to $10,000
adulterated eggs
Civil Violation of Federal Meat Inspection Act Up to $1000
civil Above and intent to defraud or distribute Up to $10,000
adulterated meat
Same as
civil Violation of Sanitary Food Transportation HazardousAct Material
Transport Act
Same as
Violation of Sanitary Food Transportation Hazardous
rimin Act Material
Transport Act
Civil Violation of Filled Milk Act Up to $1000
Upto lyr
Criminal Violation of Filled Milk Act prison
Administrative penalty for CERCLA and Up to
EPA Civil Emergency Planning and Community Up to
Right-to-know Act (EPCRA) - class 1
Administrative penalty for CERCLA and Up to
Civil EPCRA - class 2 $75,000/day
Violation of right to know reporting under Up to
Civil EPCRA $10,000/day
Civil Frivolous trade secret claim under EPCRA Up to $25,000
Administrative violation of Clean Water Up toCivil Act- class I $10,000/day$25,000 max
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Civil Administrative violation of Clean WaterAct- class II
Up to
$10,000/day
$25,000 max
Hazardous substance discharge violation Up toCivil of Clean Water Act $25,000/day
Above and gross negligence or willful No less than
Civil misconduct $100,000
Violation of Federal Insecticide,
Civil Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) Up to $1000
if for-hire applicator or dealer
Up to $500 1"
Civil Violation of FIFRA if non-hire applicator offense,then up to
$1000
Civil Knowing violation of FIFRA if registrant Max $50,000
or producer Ma__$50,000
Civil Knowing violation of FIFRA if other Max $25,000
Civil Knowing violation of FIFRA if private Max $1000applicator
Violation of Resource Conservation and Up toCivil Recovery Act $25,000/day
Civil Knowing violation of financial disclosure Up to $2500for solid waste disposal
Criminal Knowing violation of financial disclosure Up to 1 yrfor solid waste disposal prison
Violation of compliance requirement for Up toCivil solid waste $25,000/day
Criminal Knowing transportation, treatment, or Up to
storage of hazardous waste w/o permit or2 ,000/day
or2yr prison
Above (except permit) and knowing that Up to
Criminal act puts person in imminent danger of $250,000 or
death or serious bodily injury 15 yr prison
Criminal Above and defendant is organization Up to$1,000,000
Violation of solid waste disposalCivil requirements Up to $25,000
Civil
Failure of owner to notify or submission
of false information about underground
storage tanks
Up to $10,000
Fish and Violation of Wild Bird Conservation Act
Wildlife Civil (WBCA) Up to $25,000
Service
Violation of WBCA § 11 l(a)(1) or (2)
Civil importation rules, or violation of § 112 Up to $25,000
permit rules
Civil Knowing business-related importation Up to $12,000
Civil___ under WBCA § 1 (a)(3) Upto_$12,00
Civil Non-business related violation of WBCA Up to $500
Civil Civil violation of African Elephant Up to $5000Civil__Conservation Act
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Civil Violation of Bald Eagle Protection Act Up to $5000
Knowing violation of Endangered Species
Civil Act (ESA) if in business of importlexport, Up to $25,000
taking, possessing, etc.
civil Knowing violation of ESA not enumerated Up to $12,000
above
Civil Other violation of ESA Up to $500
Civil
Disclosure of public info about unlawful
employment practice under Title 7 during
proceeding
Up to $1000
Disclosure of public info about unlawful Up to 1 yr
Criminal employment practice under Title 7 during prton
proceeding prison
Reinstate,
hire, backpay
Intentional engagement in unlawful or other
Civil employment practice under Title 7 appropriate
equitable
relief
civil Willful failure to post pertinent provisions up to $100
Civil_____ of Title 7
Civil Same remedies available as under Title 7 Punitive
Civil Discriminatory practice with malice damages
civil Total damages under Title 7 for small
__ivil___ business (under 100 employees) Up to $50,000
Total damages under Title 7 for medium Up to
Civil business (over 100, less than 200 $100,000
employees) $_100,000
Total damages under Title 7 for large
Civil business (over 200, less than 500 Up to
employees) $200,000
Civil Total damages under Title 7 for big Up to
business (more than 500 employees) $300,000
Civil Willful violation of§ 15 of Equal Pay Act Up to $10,000
Criminal Willful violation of § 15 of Equal Pay Act Up to 6 moprison
Liable for
Civil Violation of § 6 or § 7 of Equal Pay Act wages andliquidated
damages
civil Violation of § 212 (child labor provision) up to $10,000I of Equal Pay Act UI Io_$10,00
Repeated or willful violation of § 6 or § 7
of Eaual Pay Act
EEOC
1213
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APPENDIX E. COST PER LIFE SAVED
Cost-Effectiveness of Selected Reglations
Cost per
premature death
Regulation Agency averted
($ millions 1990)
Unvented Space Heater Ban CPSC 0.1
Aircraft Cabin Fire Protection Standard FAA 0.1
Auto Passive Restraint/Seat Belt Standards NHTSA 0.1
Steering Column Protection Standard NHTSA 0.1
Underground Construction Standards OSHA-S 0.1
Trihalomethane Drinking Water Standards EPA 0.2
Aircraft Seat Cushion Flammability Standard FAA 0.4
Alcohol and Drug Control Standards FRA 0.4
Auto Fuel-System Integrity Standard NHTSA 0.4
Standards for Servicing Auto Wheel Rims OSHA-S 0.4
Aircraft Floor Emergency Lighting Standard FAA 0.6
Concrete & Masonry Construction Standards OSHA-S 0.6
Crane Suspended Personnel Platform Standard OSHA-S 0.7
Passive Restraints for Trucks & Buses (Proposed) NHTSA 0.7
Side-Impact Standards for Autos (Dynamic) NHTSA 0.8
Children's Sleepwear Flammability Ban CPSC 0.8
Auto Side Door Support Standards NHTSA 0.8
Low Altitude Windshear Equipment & Training FAA 1.3
Standards
Electrical Equipment Standards (Metal Mines) MSHA 1.4
Trenching and Excavation Standards OSHA-S 1.5
Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance (TCAS) FAA 1.5
Systems
Hazard Communication Standard OSHA-S 1.6
Side-Impact Standards for Trucks, Buses, and MPVs
(Proposed)
Grain Dust Explosion Prevention Standards OSHA-S 2.8
Rear Lap/Shoulder Belts for Autos NHTSA 3.2
Standards for Radionuclides in Uranium Mines EPA 3.4
Benzine NESHAP (Original: Fugitive Emissions) EPA 3.4
Ethylene Dibromide Drinking Water Standard EPA 5.7
Benzene NESHAP (Revised: Coke Byproducts) EPA 6.1
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Asbestos Occupational Exposure Limit OSHA-H 8.3
Benzene Occupational Exposure Limit OSHA-H 8.9
Electrical Equipment Standards (Coal Mines) MSHA 9.2
Arsenic Emission Standards for Glass Plants EPA 13.5
Ethylene Oxide Occupational Exposure Limit OSHA-H 20.5
Arsenic/Copper NESHAP EPA 23.0
Hazardous Waste Listing for Petroleum Refining EPA 27.6
Sludge
Cover/Move Uranium Mill Tailings (Inactive Sites) EPA 31.7
Benzene NESHAP (Revised: Transfer Operations) EPA 32.9
Cover/Move Uranium Mill Tailings (Active Sites) EPA 45.0
Acrylonitrile Occupational Exposure Limit OSHA-H 51.5
Coke Ovens Occupational Exposure Limit OSHA-H 63.5
Lockout/Tagout OSHA-S 70.9
Asbestos Occupational Exposure Limit OSHA-H 74.0
Arsenic Occupational Exposure Limit OSHA-H 106.9
Asbestos Ban EPA 110.7
Diethylstilbestrol (DES) Cattlefeed Ban FDA 124.8
Benzene NESHAP (Revised: Waste Operations) EPA 168.2
1,2 Dichloropropane Drinking Water Standard EPA 653.0
Hazardous Waste Land Disposal Ban (Ist 3rd) EPA 4,190.4
Municipal Solid Waste Landfill Standards (Proposed) EPA 19,107.0
Formaldehyde Occupational Exposure Limit OSHA-H 86,201.8
Atrazine/Alachlor Drining Water Standard EPA 92,069.7
Hazardous Waste Listing for Wood-Preserving EPA 5,700,000
Chemicals
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